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dMIGRATION FROM THE RUSSIAN NORTH
DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD
Timothy Heleniak
9 September,  1999Abstract
A majority of Russia's crucial raw materials are located in its Northern periphery. During the
Soviet period, there was a unique set of development practices that existed to exploit the
resources of the Northern regions. These included financial and other incentives for people to
move to and work in the North and the construction of large urban agglomerations in the region.
The result was that Russia had a much more densely populated North than other countries with
comparable high-latitude regions. Because of the economic structure of the Russian North, and
the fact the growth of the population was mainly  due to migration,  the population tended to be
younger, more highly educated, less Russian, more predominantly male, and more often born
outside the region.
One unintended consequence of Russia's transition to a market  economy has been a massive out-
migration from the Northern periphery. From the 16 regions defined as North in this study, over
10 percent of the population has migrated out since 1989. At the extreme are several Northern
regions where over half the population has left during this period. Those leaving tended to be
younger and more highly educated in general those more able to do so. Many older and less able
persons are left in the North without the resources to be able to leave. Most of those who
migrated did so without government assistance. The major causes of this out-migration have been
price liberalization which make the cost of fuel, food, and other consumer goods in the North
more expensive; the fiscal decentralization which shifted the burden of local revenue and
expenditure responsibility to Northern regions which often lack the necessary capacity; and a
shift in Russia's approach to the development of its Arctic and sub-Arctic regions. Among
reasons given for leaving by recent migrants from the North included the fact that they always
viewed their stay in North as temporary and that it had become senseless to stay in the North.
The study begins with a conceptual comparison between the Northern development strategy that
existed during Soviet period and that which is evolving under market conditions in Russia. This
is followed by a comparison between the Russian North and other Northern regions elsewhere in
the world. The major section of study examines patterns of migration in the Russian North during
the transition period beginning with a brief history of the settlement of the Russian North, with
an emphasis on the Northern development strategy that existed during the Soviet period. Data are
presented showing the composition of the Northern population prior to transition. A description
is then presented of the levels, direction, age-sex composition, educational, occupational
characteristics, and mechanisms of Northern migration trends. Analysis of is then done of
Northern migration trends according to migration theory in order to determine the causes of this
mass migration. The final section attempts to determine the possible future levels of migration
from the North that can be expected.
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3Forward
The study of Migration  from the Russian North During the Transition  Period originated from a
request from the Government of Russia to assist with resettlement from two Northern cities -
Norilsk and Vorkuta.  The Bank requested that this be preceded by a study of the major fiscal,
economic, and social challenges facing the designated Northern region. The current study
summarizes  the Bank's analysis of the trends, patterns, and levels of the migration that have taken
place in Russia's Northern regions during the period of economic transition. The causes and
consequences of these migration flows are also explored.
Migration has long been a strategy of adaptation that has been employed in worldwide response
to changing circumstances. In the seven years since the Soviet Union ceased to exist the successor
states have embarked on various degrees of economic liberalization. As part of those changes,
there has been a massive movement of people within and among the successor states, and
between the former Soviet Union and the rest of the world. This migration actually began prior to
the dissolution of the USSR when attempts at internal liberalization were made. The migratory
movements set off by the breakup of the Soviet Union have compounded the social instability and
economic hardships these states and regions face as they embark on the transition away from a
centrally planned society.
One of the regions where the economic transition has had an enormous impact is in the Russian
North. One of the overlooked aspects of the geography of Russia is how far North the country is
located. Almost all of Russia lies to the North of the coterminous United States. The most
southerly regions of Russia are at the same latitude as the United States' northern border with
Canada.  However, a large portion of Russia's energy and natural resources are located in its
Northern periphery. The strategy for resource extraction, along with geopolitical considerations,
led to a far different model from those employed by other Northern countries with market
economies (e.g., in Canada, Norway or Sweden). The major characteristics of Soviet policy were
much larger urban settlements, supported by massive government subsidies that came to represent
over 2 percent of GDP in the late Soviet period.
The rapid depopulation of the Russian North during the period of economic transition can be
viewed as a logical transition away from the artificial overpopulation of the Russian North during
the Soviet period. As is pointed out in this paper, the transition out of the Russian North and the
adjusting population of the North is not without difficulties and challenges. Those leaving tend
to be younger and more educated, the cohort that is most likely to migrate in virtually all settings.
Many older and less employable people are left in the North without the resources to be able to
leave.  While many have left the North, there remain more people than the economy of the region
can sustain given the high costs and commensurate public subsidies needed.  The growing
number of those without the means to leave Russia's cold remote, high-latitude regions therefore
remains a challenge.
Maureen Lewis
Sector Manager, Human Development Economics
Europe and Central Asia Region
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5I. INTRODUCTION
1.  The Russian North in Transition: It would be difficult to imagine Russia without it
Northern territories. The region and its abundant natural resources have long played an important
role in Russia and the Soviet Union's overall economic development. Initially, furs were the
major attraction and later gas, oil, timber and other resources necessary for modern economic
development became the sought-after commodities. As the Russian economy goes through the
current social, economic, and political transformation so does its Northern periphery. The
transformation of the Russian North can only be understood within the context of the overall
systematic transition of the Russian economy and society. How the Russian North came to be and
the current difficulties it faces are the result of the overall political-economic system that the
Northern regions are a part of.
2.  It is an interesting intellectual exercise to imagine how the Russian North would have
been developed if the command-administrative  economy of Soviet Union had never existed and
the Northern regions had developed within the context of a market economy. A clue is offered by
how other Northern regions in the world have developed. The aspect of the Russian North that is
the subject of this study - population size - is a good illustration for comparison. The Russian
North contains far more people than other Northern regions. There has already been considerable
evidence of adjustment towards the population density levels of other Northern areas through
massive out-migration. However, this process, as the transition of the country in general, has
proceeded in a rather chaotic manner. Just as there is no blueprint for transition from plan to
market, there are no guidelines for how the Russian North is to make the transition to sustainable
development.
3.  The overall transition of the Russian economy from central planning to some sort of
market economy involves a number of simultaneous processes, all of which have an impact on
the scale and type of development in the Northern regions. One that has had an enormous impact
on the North has been the liberalization of prices. When prices were administratively  set during
the Soviet period, many of the implicit costs, especially for transport and energy, were hidden.
The price liberalization of January 1992 caused the true cost to be reflected in consumer and
other goods throughout the country. This had an especially severe impact in the distant Northern
regions, as relative prices jumped considerably relative to other regions located closer to sources
of production. Most forms of agriculture are not possible in the cold climate of the North,
requiring most food, consumer, and other goods to have to be shipped from elsewhere in Russia.
6The amount of goods that had to be shipped North in Russia to support the level of population
and development were probably only possible under the Soviet pricing system which failed to
incorporate the real cost of transportation to and from the North. The state sponsored 'Northern
shipment' would probably not have been undertaken by a private company do to the inability to
make a profit from the venture. The budget allocation for the 'Northern shipment' has declined
considerably since 1992 and there are numerous problems reported in having this reduced
amount delivered.
4.  During Soviet times, when the economy was more centrally controlled, there was a long
list of 'Northern' benefits paid from the state budget. These included benefits for moving to the
North, living in the North, and returning from the North. The responsibility for financing many
of these budget-funded benefits was passed along to enterprises and local Northern governments
during the early period of economic reform when many federal responsibilities were being off
loaded to local governments. However, many of these 'Northern' benefits have either been
eliminated by newly privatized companies or go unpaid.
5.  Another aspect of economic transition in Russia that has affected the North has been the
opening up of the economy to the outside world and the liberalization of foreign trade. The
liberalization of foreign trade allowed some regions to begin to profit enormously from the
products they produced, while others suffered greatly because of the uncompetitivness of their
output on world markets. Among those Northern regions that benefited were the resource-rich
Northern regions of West Siberia where the bulk of Russia's oil and gas are located. The
liberalization of foreign trade and travel, combined with domestic price liberalization and
privatization, has radically changed the economic geography of the Northern regions. Companies
in all regions, including Northern ones, now more-or-less  purchase inputs from the cheapest
supplier and sell their outputs to the highest bidder, rather than having these decision made
administratively  by officials in Moscow. For many of the distant Northern regions, this has
meant increased foreign trade and a decreased dependence on Moscow and the rest of central
Russia. Many regions in the Russian Far East are much closer to the Pacific Rim countries such
as Japan and Korea, or the West Coast of the United States, than there are to central Russia.
6.  However, for enterprises in most Northern regions it has become apparent that much
economic activity is no longer viable under the new market conditions. Many regions of Russia
have suffered during the transition period as there has been an increasing divergence between
7those few which have been able to leverage their natural or locational advantages during the
transition period and those many which have suffered considerably. Most of the regions in
Russia's Northern periphery have suffered more relative to the rest of the country as the Soviet
Union promoted a scale of development that is proving not to be viable in a more open, market-
oriented society.
7.  Defining the Russian North: The terms "Russian North", "Siberia", "Arctic region",
"Far East" and other terms used to denote the cold, distant, Northern periphery far from Moscow
are often used without precisely defining the geographic area under consideration. In fact, there
is no uniform definition for most of these terms. One Russian scholar of the Soviet/Russian north
characterized the North by the following four criteria: location to the north of long-standing
settled and economically developed areas of the country and remoteness from large industrial
centers; harsh climatic conditions, which make economic and social development difficult as a
result of long winters and permafrost over much of the territory; low population density and a
less developed industrial base; and greater expenditure of resources for the exploitation of
natural resources than would be required for the exploitation of similar resources farther south.'
This definition of the North is based upon economnic  as well as physical criteria, and includes the
characteristics of remoteness, in this case remoteness from Moscow and the more populated and
developed areas of the country.
8.  The criteria Slavin laid out are similar  to those employed by the Soviet/Russian
governments in classifying portions of the country as 'Northern'. For planning, economic
development, and other purposes, the Russian government defines two different types of
Northern regions, the Far North (Kraynyy Sever) and regions equivalent to the Far North
(mestnosti  priravnennyye  k rayonam  Kraynego  Severa). The designation  of these regions  was for
the purpose of setting coefficients for wages and other entitlements as part of a program to
recruit workers for tours of northern duty and stimulate economic development of some of the
less developed Northern regions.
9.  According to this definition, the European North and most of the West Siberian, East
Siberian, and Far East economic regions were classified as the North. In fact, in the Soviet
Union, 49 percent of the country was classified as being in the North or regions equivalent to the
8North. The Far North and regions equivalent to the Far North encompass 11,900 thousand square
kilometers or 69.7 percent of the entire territory of Russia. As of January 1, 1997, there were
12.1 million persons living in this region representing 8.2 percent of the entire population of the
country. Twenty-seven of the 89 subjects of the federation fall partially or total into the Far
North or regions equivalent to the Far North (see table 4).
10.  One difficulty with any definition of the North based upon physical or climatic criteria is
that the boundaries of such a region cut across administrative boundaries and most economic and
social statistics are presented at the oblast-level, i.e. at the level of the 89 subjects of the
federation. There are few sets of data presented for the Far North and equivalent regions, and to
construct a comprehensive set of data for analysis would require additional processing. 2 For this
reason, when constructing a 'Russian North' for an analysis that employs large amounts of
economic and social data as this study of migration issues does, it is preferable to either wholly
include or exclude a region, so as not to cut across administrative boundaries. The North that will
be examined in this study consists of 16 regions or subjects of the federation. These are the 10
regions that fall entirely into the Far North, the five regions that are split between the Far North
and regions equivalent to the Far North, the Khanty-Mansiy  Autonomous Okrug, and the city of
Norilsk. Norilsk is physically located in the Taymyr Okrug, which is included in the definition of
the North here, but administratively part of the Krasnoyarsk Kray, which is not part of the
definition of the North to be used in the study. This restricted definition of the North makes up
57 percent of Russia's territory and contains 8,945 thousand persons or 6.1 percent of the total
population (as of January 1, 1999). The justification for the selection of these regions for the
study is that it is from these Northern regions that migration has been most acute during Russia's
economic transition.
11.  Comparison between the Russian North and other Northern regions: Russia is one of
eight 'Northern' countries in the world. These are countries where all or parts of their territories
lie north of 60 degrees north latitude. The other countries or regions include the state of Alaska
IV.S.  Slavin, The Soviet North: Present  Development and Future Prospects, Moscow:  Progress  Publishers,
1972  as cited in  Bradshaw,  Michael  J, "The  Russian  North  in Transition:  General  Introduction",  Post-Soviet
Geography,  April 1995,  pp. 195-203.
2 The most  recent  Russian  statistical  yearbook  contained  a five-page  section  on the Far North  and regions
equivalent to the Far North, see Goskomstat Rossii,  Rossiyskiy statisticheskiy yezhegodnik: statisticheskiy
sbornik,  Moscow:  Logos,  pp. 1  126-1130.  The last  complete  yearbook  on the Far North  was  issued  in 1993,
Goskomstat Rossii, Rayony Kraynego Severa i mestnosti,  priravnennyye k rayonam Kraynego Severa, v
1992 godu: statisticheskiy sbornik, Moscow: 1993.
9in the United  States,  the Northwest  and  Yukon Territories  of Canada,  all of Iceland  and
Greenland,  and the northem  regions  of Norway,  Sweden,  and Finland.  The internal  divisions
within each country  are used to delineate  the regions  considered  northem.  If just  the portion  of
the Russian to be examined  in this  study is considered  'North',  then  the Russian  'North'  makes
up 55 percent  of the total northem  territory  in the world (see table  1). The Canadian  North  makes
up about  22 percent  of the total Northern  territory,  Greenland  about  12 percent,  and Alaska  9
percent.  A point of departure  for comparison  of these Northern  regions  is while the Russian
North  makes up just  over half the northern  territory,  it contains  about 80 percent  of the total
northern  population  of approximately  11.9 million.
Table 1: Population Density of the Russian North and Comparable Northern Regions
Density
Area  (persons per
(ths. sq.  Population  square Largest urban
Region  kms.)  (ths.)  kilometer) areas (ths.)
RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  17,075.4  147,104.6  8.6
Far North and equivalent regions  11,900.0  12,105.1  1.0
The North (as defined in study)  9,734.1  9,098.9  0.9 Murmansk (393.3)
UNITED STATES  9,528  270,299  28.4
Alaska  1,527  614  0.4 Anchorage (250.5)
CANADA  9,922  30,300  3.1
Northwest Territories  3.380  68  0.02 Yellownife (18.0)
Yukon Territory  483  32  0.07 Whitehorse (13.0)
GREENLAND (Kalaallit Nunaat)  2,176  56  0.03 Nuuk (Godthab) (12.8)
ICELAND  103  275  2.7 Reykjavik (161.1)
NORWAY  324  4,418  13.6
Nord-Trondelag  22  127  5.7 Steinkjaer (10.3)
Norland  38  239  6.2 Bodo (33.0)
Troms  26  150  5.8 Tromso (47.1)
Finnmark  49  75  1.5 Vadso (less than 8.0)
SWEDEN  450  8,900  19.8
Norrbotten  106  267  2.5 Lulea (42.7)
Vasterbotten  55  258  4.7 Umea (103.1)
FINLAND  338  5,100  15.1
Oulu  57  453  8.0 Oulu (113.6)
Lapland  99  201  2.0 Rovaniemi (57.0)
Sources and notes:
Russia: The Far North and regions equivalent to the Far North are based upon the GOR's official definition.
The North, as defined in this study, are the 16 regions included in the study including Norilsk.
Data are from Goskomstat Rossii, Chislennost' naseleniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii po gorodam, poselkam
Gorodskogo tipa i rayonam na I yanvarya 1998 g., 1998. United States: US Census Bureau Homepage
(http:/Hwww.census.gov).  Canada: Statistics Canada website (http://www.statcan.caJ).  Greenland: Statistics
Greendland web site. Iceland: Statistics Iceland website (http://www.statice.isl).  Finland: Statistics Finland
website (http://www.stat.fi/sf/home.html).  Norway: Statistical Yearbook of Norway 1998 (from Statistics
Norway web site, http://www.ssb.no/). Sweden: Northern Forum web page (http:llwww.northemforum.orgl)
1012.  There are about 95 persons per 100 square kilometers in the Russian North, which makes
it about two-and-a-half times as densely populated as Alaska. The population density is roughly
50 times that of the Canadian North and Greenland but about a quarter that of the Iceland and the
northern portions of the three Scandinavian countries. These latter four are much more hospitable
to human habitation because of the moderating influences of the Gulf Stream. This effect
partially explains why the largest urban area in the Russian North and its only European ice-free
port, Murmansk (393.3 thousand people in 1997), lies near the border with Finland. Altogether,
there are 11 cities of over 200 thousand in these northern regions and 10 of them are in Russia.
The only sizable Northern city outside of Russia is Anchorage, Alaska with a population of 250
thousand.
13.  Of course, climatic factors are not the only determinants of the population size and
density of the northern regions. The amount and type of natural resources and the economic
systems  that these northern regions are a part of also plays a factor. Prior to the beginning of the
industrialization in the 18t century, most of these northern regions were occupied by scattered
indigenous populations engaged in traditional economic activities of reindeer herding, fishing,
and whaling. Some of the northern regions contain very few resources of use to industrial
economies, while others such as Russia, contains large amounts not just of Russia's but also of
the world's known deposits. With the exception of Iceland, all of the Northern regions are
periphery regions where development priorities are determined by the core. 3 In the Russian
North, "a desire for economic self-sufficiency promoted the development of mineral resources in
remote northern regions, a policy made possible by the use of forced labor and a disregard for the
real economic, social, and environmental costs of high-latitude industrialization". 4 For the
Russian North, one result of the centrally planned economic system where true labor and
transport costs were not reflected was an over-population compared to other northern regions
even when the greater mineral resources of Russia's North are taken into consideration. The
manner in which other countries have developed their Northern peripheries, while still often
chaotic, haphazard and with little regard for the environment or the natives peoples of these
regions, usually relied upon far less labor resources because the cost of exploitation of these
high-latitude regions was more properly reflected.
3 Greenland  is a self-governing  part of Denmark,  that  has  had limited  autonomy  since  1979  when  Home
Rule  was  instituted.
4 Bradshaw, Michael, "The Russian  North in Transition: General Introduction", Post-Soviet  Geography,
April 1995,  p. 199.
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D  2  The North  as defined  in this study
D  Regions equivalent to the Far NorthII. HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF MIGRATION  IN THE RUSSIAN NORTH
14.  History and Development of the Russian North: In order to understand the current
population size and distribution in the Russian North, it is useful to briefly review the past
settlement patterns of the region, as well as the development policies of the Russian and Soviet
governments.  Because it was blocked from expanding westward, the Russian Empire began to
expand towards the east. After some initial difficulties, it expanded across the Urals and in 1620
accomplished  the annexation of West Siberia up to the Yenesi River. At the time, what is now
Siberia and the Far East was populated by a small number of indigenous native peoples widely
disbursed in small groups throughout the region engaged in reindeer herding, fishing, and other
subsistence activities. One estimate puts the total number native population in Siberia and the Far
East at 220,000 at the time of first contact with the Russians, which is about the maximum  that
the territory could support with the given level of technology in the climatic conditions of the
region.
15.  The expansion across Siberia to the Pacific was very rapid, reached in 1643. By 1689,
Russia had laid claim to all of Siberia and the Far East north of the Amur River basin. It was a
desire for the furs of the animals of Siberia and their rather rapid extermination or depletion that
lead to rapid conquest of the territory. The Russians forced many of the natives to pay a yasak or
tribute in the form of a prescribed number of furs. Russian soon became a major supplier of furs
to Europe and Asia, deriving 10 percent of total national income from the sale of the commodity.
The impact of the 'conquest' on the lives of many natives was more apparent than real especially
in the Far East where distance made direct control difficult. Because of the small numbers of
natives in Siberia and the Far East, the migration of Russians caused them to become a
demographic minority by 1678, with roughly equal numbers of 150,000  to 200,000 each at the
end of the 17th century.
16.  While the fur trade opened up Siberia, it was the exile system that populated it when
exile to Siberia became an official form of punishment in the mid-17th century. At the end of the
17th century, the Siberian resources attracting the Empire's interest switched from furs to iron
and copper ores. From the beginning to end of 18th century, the number of Russians living in
Siberia increased from 300,000 to perhaps 900,000 and by middle of 19th century to 2.7 million.
At the end of the 19'h  and beginning of the 20h century, migration to Siberia increased rapidly. In
1861, the serfs were freed and after legal restrictions on their movements were lifted, many
13migrated east, often with state assistance. In the 1890s, construction of the Trans-Siberian
railroad commenced and this combined with the 1906 reforms turned emigration to Siberia into a
flood. From 1897 to 1917, the population of Siberia and the Far East nearly doubled going from
5.8 to 10.6 million persons. As of 1917, the Russian share of Siberia's population was 77.6
percent.
17.  The 1917 revolution brought about a number of significant changes in the development
and population policies of Siberia and the North. The first was the establishment of the various
ethno-territorial units based on the homelands of the Siberian indigenous groups. In many cases,
especially in the North, this was done to formally give territorial recognition of the ethnic
homeland of non-Russian nationalities. In the case of larger ethnic groups, a republic was created
(e.g. Yakutiya) and in the cases of smaller groups, an autonomous okrug (eg. Chukotka okrug).
This was accompanied by moderate and varying degrees of local autonomy over matters of
regional economic development.  The Committee on the North was created in 1924 for the
purpose of making recommending  to state policy makers concerning the development of the
various Northern aboriginal peoples. This committee was abolished in 1935 and its tasks
assigned to Glavsevmorput' (The Main Administration for the North Sea Route). There were also
efforts to give some of these indigenous groups written languages where very few had them
before and other efforts to 'modernize' them.
18.  Northern labor policies during the Soviet period can be broken down into three major
overlapping phases. Initially, the industrial and resource enterprises of Siberia and the North
were staffed with forced labor. The infamous gulag system  was established in 1924 and during
its peak in 1937-38, some 7 million persons were sent to the camps. The system was abolished
after Stalin's death in 1953. The founding and development of Norilsk, the mining and
metallurgical center in northern Siberia, serves as a good example of the various attempts by the
Soviet government to provide an adequate labor force to an enterprise in these high latitude
regions. Norilsk is one of only 3 urban settlements in the world North of the Arctic Circle with
over 100,000  persons (the others are Murmansk and Vorkuta). Copper-nickel ores were
discovered in the around Norilsk in 1920 and construction of the Norilsk Mining and
Metallurgical Combine began in 1935 with a labor force consisting almost entirely of prisoners.
At the time of its establishment in 1933, Glavsevmorput' was responsible for all Northern
development  but the NKVD (Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs, a predecessor to the
KGB) was put in charge of construction in Norilsk.
1419.  It was realized during the first five-year  plan (1928-1933) that the special conditions of
the Arctic required special development approaches. The establishment of the North Sea route
was critical to the development of the North. A supply grid was established with the North Sea
Route delivering supplies to the north-south lines of the grid, the major Siberian rivers -the Ob-
Irtysh, Yenisei, Lena, and Indigirka-Kolyma.
20.  There was a realization early on in the Soviet period that the development of the
Northern regions could not be carried out entirely with convict labor and incentives had to be
established for both labor recruitment and labor retention. In 1932, a decree was passed
establishing the first northern wage increments (severnaya nadbavka). These were incremental
increases in wages that built up over time. These were combined with regional wage coefficients,
longer period of annual leave entitlements, improved pension rights, and housing privileges.
There were different coefficients for different regions of the country with a coefficient of 2.0 for
the far northeast corner of the country, which doubled the basic wage. The wage coefficients
were designed to compensate for the higher cost of living in the Northern and periphery regions
while the wage increments were to reduce turnover since they were cumulative - the longer one
stayed in the North, the higher was the value of the increment.
21.  A third phase began when there was the realization that there was a difference between
labor recruitment and labor retention to the Northern regions and that northern wage coefficients
were not sufficient to solve the retention problem. While the Northern coefficients, coupled with
ognabor (organization committees) could recruit a sufficient labor force for priority construction
projects as the Baykal-Amur  Mainline (BAM) and the opening of the oil and gas fields of the
northern Tyumen, these policies were not sufficient to retain the labor force, many of whom left
because of the lack of social amenities. In the 1970s, steps were taken to increase housing,
medical care, schools, and the social infrastructure in general for those working in the North.
These policies did seem to have some influence on increasing the quality of life and reducing
labor turnover in the North.
22.  The cumulative effects of these policies are that Siberia and the Far East's share of the
total Russian population over the last century increased from 5.1 of the total population in 1897
to 21.8 percent at the time of the 1989 census. During the Soviet period, the population of Siberia
and the Far East tripled from 10.7 million to 32.1 million in 1989, at the same time the
population of Russia increased by 64 percent. The population of the Russian North peaked in
151991, just  prior to the breakup  of the Soviet Union and the onset of economic  reforms  in Russia.
It has declined  slightly  as a share of the total Russian  population  since then  as the population
center  of Russia  moves westward.  How much further  it will decline  is the subject  of this study.
23.  Composition  of the Northern  Population  Prior  to Transition:  Analysis of the
population  of the Northern  regions  prior to the transition  period reveal  the effects of past
development  policies  as well as offering  insights  into possible  migration  patterns  in the future.5
The  1989 population  census was fortuitously  conducted  just  prior  to the breakup  of the Soviet
Union  and the beginning  of the period of economic  reform  in Russia,  which  precipitated  much of
the out migration  from the Northern  regions.  The following  is an overview  of the  composition  of
the Northern  population  by age,  sex, nationality,  place  of birth,  length  of residency,  branch  of the
economy,  level  of education,  and settlement  size.
24.  Russia has among  the lowest ratios  of males to females  of any country  in the world. At
the time of the  1989 census,  there were  88 males for every  100 females.  This is due to the fact
that the various  demographic  disasters  during this century  have disproportionately  affected  men
and the fact that Russian  men have long had  a much higher mortality  rate than women.  Because
the Northern  regions  tend to disproportionally  draw men to work in the various  industrial  sectors,
this sex imbalance  is overcome  so that there  were  101 males  for every  100 females  in the North.
The excess  of males over females  is most pronounced  in the young  working  ages from  15 to 34,
where  there are  116 males  for every  100 females.
5The  analysis of migration patterns to and from the Russian North in this paper are based upon several
different sources of data, all of which originate from Goskomstat  Rossii (The State Committee on Statistics
of the Russian Federation).  These can be broken down into census results, published and unpublished
migration data, and survey  results. The most recent population census for Russia was  conducted in 1989.
This was the last census conducted for the USSR. Since 1993, the resident permit (propiska)  system has not
been in force in Russia except for certain large metropolitan  areas. However, persons moving to a new
location are still required to register such moves at the place of origin and destination. As a result, data on
the migrants age, sex, educational level, place of origin and destination are recorded and are rather
complete. In addition, two surveys were conducted, one of recent migrants from the North and the other of
potential migrants who remained in the North. The survey of approximately  600 recent migrants asked
questions about motivations  for moving to the North originally, living standards while in the North, reasons
for leaving, the actual migration process, adaptation  to the new environment,  and any assistance received in
the migration process. The survey of 2,000 potential Northern migrants (pensioners, unemployed,  disabled,
and students) in four Northern regions contained questions about desire to leave the North, current living
conditions, and impediments to migrating.
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25.  The vast differences in the age structure between the Northern regions and Russia as
whole can be clearly seen in the age-sex pyramids of both in 1989 (figure 2). The most noticeable
difference in the pyramid of the North is the large bulge in the young working ages from 20 to
39. These are the ages where people were attracted to inducements  to move to the North and
work for a period of time in order to accumulate sufficient savings. Many would leave the North
before or at retirement ages, which explains why the pension-age population 6 was only 8.8 of the
total in the North versus 18.5 percent for all of Russia in 1989.  The average age of the Russian
population in 1989  was 35 while in the North it was much younger. In the Khanty-Mansiy and
Yamal-Nenets okrugs where young workers were recruited to work in the oil and gas regions, the
average age was only 26.
26.  Eleven of the sixteen regions in the study are ethnic homelands of indigenous peoples of
North or Siberia. Four of these are republics that are the titular areas of some of the larger
Northern or Siberian groups - the Karelians, Komi, Yakuts, and Tuvans - and seven are the
homelands of the smaller-numbered 'Peoples of the North' (malochislenny narod Severa). Due to
centuries of in migration of Russians and other Slavic groups, these indigenous groups have long
ceased to be the majority in the North or Siberia and even in their ethnic homelands. Though
Russians comprise a majority of the North's population, 71 percent in 1989 (see table 2), because
6 Males  over  59 and  females  over  54.
17of the larger number of Ukrainians and Belarussians, as well as the indigenous Northern and
Siberian nationalities, this share is smaller than in Russia as a whole, where they comprised 82
percent of the population in 1989. Ukrainians and Belarussians together made up 11.3 percent of
the North's population in 1989,  the four major indigenous groups 10.7 percent, the small-
numbered Peoples of the North only 1.9 percent. The ethnic composition of each Northern region
has implications for migration patterns following  the breakup of the Soviet Union and the
devolution of economic development planning to regional authorities.
Table 2: The Ethnic Composition of the Regions of the Far North, 1989
Percent
Region  Nationality  Number  Distribution
Russia  All nationalities  147,021,869  100.0
Russian  119,865,946  81.5
Ukrainian  4,362,872  3.0
Belarussian  1,206,222  0.8
Other  FSU  state  titular  nationalities  2,217,729  1.5
Tatars  5,522,096  3.8
Bashkirs  1,345,273  0.9
Germans  842,295  0.6
Jews  536,848  0.4
Major ethnic groups of Siberia and the North  1,047,632  0.7
Yakuts  380,242  0.3
Komi  336,309  0.2
Tuvans  206,160  0.1
Karelians  124,921  0.1
Small-Numbered  Peoples  of the North  181,517  0.1
Other nationalities  9,893,439  6.7
The North  All nationalities  9,773,491  100.0
Russian  6,926,750  70.9
Ukrainian  784,701  8.0
Belarussian  221,744  2.3
Other FSU state titular nationalities  75,875  0.8
Tatars  213,834  2.2
Bashkirs  49,096  0.5
Germans  35,569  0.4
Jews  4,416  0.0
Major ethnic groups of Siberia and the North  1,047,632  10.7
Yakuts  380,242  3.9
Komi  336,309  3.4
Tuvans  206,160  2.1
Karelians  124,921  1.3
Small-Numbered  Peoples  of the North  181,517  1.9
Other nationalities  232,367  2.4
Sources and notes:
CIS Statistical Committee & East View Publications, 1989 USSR Population Census CD-ROM
1827.  The Russian share of the population of the Northern regions ranges from a high of 92
percent in the Archangelsk oblast to a low of 32 percent in the Tuva republic. Tuva shows up as
an outlier as this is the only case where Russians do not constitute the majority of the population.
The region where Russians constitute the second lowest share is Yakutiya where in 1989 they
made up barely a majority of the population with 50.3 percent of the population. The Ukrainian
shares of four Northern regions -the Khanty-Mansiys,  Yamal-Nenets, and Chukotka okrugs, and
the Magadan oblast were between 12 and 19 percent. From these regions then it would not be
surprising if there were high rates of out migration following the breakup of the Soviet Union as
these groups fled to their ethnic homelands fearing the loss of benefits and other privileges.
28.  Of the four larger ethnic groups, only the Tuvans constitute a majority in their homeland,
making up 64 percent of the Tuva republic. The next highest share are the Yakuts who were one-
third of the total of Yakutiya, a figure that has likely increased since then. There are 26 ethnic
groups classified as small-numbered 'Peoples of the North'. All together these groups number
only 182  thousand making up less than 2 percent of the entire Northern population. Even more so
than the larger Northern and Siberian ethnic groups, these smaller nationalities continue to
engage in traditional Northern economic activities of reindeer heading, fishing, and whaling and
show even less propensity to migrate  outside the North. There are some that would argue that it
is these groups who have been most severally affected by the migration and the overall
withdrawal of subsidies from the North. Like indigenous Northern peoples elsewhere in the
world, a system of welfare-like dependence was created for these people that is no longer
sustained and they are often ill-equipped to participate in the modern economy or the areas they
used for traditional activities have been badly polluted as a result of excessive industrialization of
the North.
29.  The Russian North is a region of newcomers and people who were born elsewhere. An
overview of the Northern population by place of birth and length of residency is a useful
barometer of both their possible propensity to migrate as well as their possible destination
choices. There are two aspects of migration theory that are useful for this analysis. The first is
that people who migrate once are more likely to migrate again. The second is that people tend to
migrate to places where they already have established social and economic ties. While all people
who moved to the North from other regions of Russia or outside of Russia cannot necessarily be
expected to return to their places of birth, many of them will given that many will have friends,
family, and social networks developed in these regions.
1930.  About half of the total population of Russia (48.8 percent) were born in the region that
they currently live in while barely a third of the North population (36.5 percent) were born in the
Northern region they were residing at the time of the 1989 census (table 3). The oil and gas
regions of Tyumen, the Khanty-Mansiy and Yamal-Nenets  Okrugs have the smallest local-born
populations, with only 27.5 and 24.1 percent of the populations being born in these regions. The
Chukotka Okrug and Magadan Oblast also stood with barely a quarter of their populations being
bom in those regions. It should not be surprising then that these regions had the highest rates of
out migration of the Northern regions during the transition period. Of those not living in the
region they were born, the North also has a much higher share of their population recently
arrived than the rest of the country. In Russia, of those not living in the region they were born,
14.4 percent have arrived within the past five years whereas in the North, a quarter (24.7 percent)
have lived in the North less than five years. Khanty-Mansiy and Yamal-Nenets Okrugs again
stand out with the large portion of new arrivals, where 41.8 and 50.8 percent of the population
had arrived within the past five years.
31.  One interesting and telling characteristic of the place of birth of the Northern population
is the large number who were born outside of Russia, especially in Ukraine and Belarus. In 1989,
15.2 percent of the Northern population was born outside the country, double the share for all
Russia of 7.1 percent. Ukraine and Belarus were large suppliers of skilled industrial labor for
Northern development projects. The same four regions show up with large foreign-born
populations. The Khanty-Mansiy and Yamal-Nenets  Okrugs, Magadan oblast, and Chukotka
Okrug all had between 23 and 30 percent of populations who were born outside of Russia. In the
Yamal-Nenets and Chukotka Okrugs and Magadan oblast, one in five persons were born in
Ukraine.
32.  Of those who migrate to the North from elsewhere in Russia, they came from a variety of
source regions with only a few sending noticeably larger numbers than others did. The Vologda
oblast, which is the only oblast-level unit in the North economic region that is not considered to
be part of the Far North or equivalents regions, the Krasnodar Kray, Bashkortostan, and
Sverdlovsk are areas where 100,000 or more persons living in the Far North were born.
20Table 3: Population  of the Russian North by Place of Birth and Length of Residency, 1989
Number of persons  Percent
Russia  The North  Russia  The North
Population by Place of Birth
Total population, 1989  147,021,869  9,773,491  100.0  100.0
Former Soviet Union  146,027,781  9,721,197  99.3  99.5
Russia  135,549,786  8,238,541  92.2  84.3
Far North and equiv. Regions  21,581,040  5,456,234  14.7  55.8
Far North  6,825,500  4,503,684  4.6  46.1
Equivalent regions  14,755,540  952,550  10.0  9.7
Outside the North  113,968,746  2,782,307  77.5  28.5
Other FSU  10,477,995  1,482,656  7.1  15.2
Ukraine  4,595,811  858,804  3.1  8.8
Belarus  1,408,619  204,521  1.0  2.1
Other  4,473,565  419,331  3.0  4.3
Outside FSU or unknown  994,088  52,294  0.7  0.5
Population by Length of Residency
Total population, 1989  147,021,869  9,773,491  100.0  100.0
Number who have lived continuosly in  71,768,212  3,571,384  48.8  36.5
region since birth
Number who have not lived continuosly  in  75,253,657  6,202,107  51.2  63.5
region since birth
Less than one year  5,394,057  534,194  3.7  5.5
1 year  3,901,508  416,765  2.7  4.3
2 years  3,555,296  437,654  2.4  4.5
3 years  3,175,905  387,362  2.2  4.0
4 years  2,754,736  339,674  1.9  3.5
5 years  2,455,800  299,271  1.7  3.1
6-9 years  8,884,421  1,002,047  6.0  10.3
10-14 years  9,018,714  795,327  6.1  8.1
15-19 years  7,830,697  572,086  5.3  5.9
20 or more years  28,282,523  1,417,727  19.2  14.5
Sources and notes:
CIS Statistical Cornnittee and East View Publications, 1989 USSR Population Census, CD-
ROM.
33.  Figure 3 shows the level  of education  of the population  of the Russian  North  compared
to the country as a whole. The differences  in the educational  levels  of the Northern  population
are  due mainly to the age and occupational  structure  of the region.  There  are about the  same
number of persons  with higher education  in the North  than  the rest  of the country  but many more
persons  with both general  and  specialized  secondary  education.  Presumably,  many  persons with
this  level of education,  especially  in a technical  field,  are drawn to work in the various  industries
that the Northern  regions  specialize  in. There  are far fewer persons  with either an  incomplete
secondary  education  or just  a primary  schools education  as Northern  enterprises  could be more
21selective in their recruitment of workers. There are several Norther  regions such as Murmansk
Chukotka, Kamchatka,  and Magadan where the number  of persons with highe  eucat  far
exceeds the national average.
34.  As of January 1, 1998,  the Population of the Russian North was disbursed among 168
rural rayons and 413 urban centers. Of the urban centers, 125 are cities (gorod) and 282 are small
towns (pose/ok gorodskogo tipa)
7. Together these groups comprise the urban population. The
remainder of the Northemn population  lives in 1,391  rural settlements Citar  furth  b  e
down into major metropolitan cities with over 500,000 (of which there are none in the North),
large cities Of 100 to 500 thousand (13 in the North), medium  cities of 50 to 100  thouad1i
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Note:  The  sixteen  cities  shown  are  those  in the  North  with  populations  over  100,000  in 1991.
Forty  percent  of the  entire  Northern  population  lives  in these  sixteen  urban  areas.living in urban areas based upon whether there are larger, urban settlements usually centered
around resource extraction. The Evenki and Koryak Okrugs not only have small populations,
they have no settlements  classified as cities and consequently, the percent of the populations of
these two regions living in urban areas is 24.5 and 30.0 percent respectively. On the opposite
extreme are regions such as Murmansk, Khanty-Mansiy,  Magadan, and Sakhalin that contain
large urban agglomerations  where 85 percent or more of the population resides.
35.  In 1991, when the population of the North peaked, there were eleven Northern cities with
over a quarter-million persons, the largest being Murmansk with 472,900 persons (figure 4).
Roughly a third of the population of the Russian North were concentrated in these eleven
settlements. Many of the settlements in the Russian North are classified as "one-company" towns
or more specifically, monopoly-industrial  enterprises (promyshlennyy  predpriyatiya-
monopolista). The North, with 6.6 percent of the population, contains 14.5 percent of those
enterprises where more than half of industrial employment is concentrated in one enterprise and
19 percent where more than 80 percent of industrial workers in a town are in one enterprise.
36.  Many of these are enterprises in the primary sectors based upon the extraction of
resources located in the North. In Karelia and Arkhangel' sk in the European North and in
Sakhalin, in the Far East, most of the monopoly enterprises are timber and wood processing. In
the west Siberian regions of Khanty-Mansysk  and Yamal-Nenets  and eastern portion of the Komi
Republic, the monopoly enterprises are based on fuels extraction and processing. There are
numerous monopoly enterprises scattered across the North based upon the extraction of minerals
and precious metals. There are several others along the Northern and Far East coastal areas
where fishing and fish processing industries predominate as the monopoly enterprises.
37.  Most of the largest Northern settlements  described above fall into this category of having
just  1 or 2 monopoly enterprise where the bulk of the industrial workforce was employed. These
include Arkhangel' sk, where a third of all industrial workers are employed in one forestry and
woodworking enterprise, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy,  the capital of the Kamchatka Oblast where
60 percent of the industrial workforce is employed in one fish processing plant and Norilsk
where over 80 percent of industrial workers are employed by the Norilsk Industrial Concern.
38.  Migration in Russia and the Russian North during Transition: The recent trend of
migration out of the Russian North during the 1990s should be viewed against the backdrop of
past migration patterns in the Soviet Union and the migration and population trends of the post-
24Soviet period. For much of the Soviet period, and in fact for centuries prior to the creation of the
Soviet Union, the predominant migration pattern was out from the central core of Russian
settlement in present-day European Russia. Russians and other mobile ethnic groups migrated
south to Central Asia and the Caucasus, west toward to Ukraine, northeast towards the Baltics,
and north and west into Siberia. During the Soviet period, this migration became more deliberate
and state-sponsored when industrial workers and administrators were needed to staff the newly
acquired and industrializing  periphery regions. The trend of out-migration  from Russia to the
non-Russian states of the FSU reversed itself in the mid-1970s when more Russians left the
southern tier states than went to these regions.
39.  However, internally within Russia, the pattern of migration from central Russia to the
periphery regions in the North and Siberia persisted through the 1980s. During the 1980s, only
three of the eleven larger economic regions in Russia were experiencing out migration - the
Volga-Vytaka,  Central Chemozem, and Urals. 8 All others had positive rates of net migration,
partially due to the fact that Russia overall was experiencing immigration. During this period,
West Siberia and the Far East had two of the three highest rates of in-migration of the eleven
economic regions.
40.  The breakup of the Soviet Union and the concomitant economic reforms and
decentralization had a dramatic impact on these migration patterns, as well as other demographic
trends. Beginning in 1992,  return migration  from the former Soviet Union to Russia increased
dramatically. It peaked in 1994 when over a million persons migrated from the non-Russian
states. Return migration to Russia has slowed considerably since then, so that in 1996 net
miigration  to Russia was less than half of what it was at its peak in 1994. The breakup of the
Soviet Union  then accelerated the return of Russians and other nationalities from Central Asia
and the Transcaucasus and reversed the pattern of out-migration  to the Baltics and other western
FSU states. By 1994,  Russia was the only FSU state to have positive net migration.
8The  89 'subjects  of the federation'  are grouped  into eleven  economic  regions.  These  units  are a remnant  of
the central  planning  period  and  served  as the basis  for regionally  planning  the economy.  They  currently
serve  no administrative  function.  Data  for 89  regions  are grouped  into  these  eleven  economic  regions  in
statistical  and  other  publications  and  are often  referred  to because  of the more  manageable  number.
25Figure  5: Net  Migration  by Region,  1989-1997
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41.  The pattern of migration out of the North and return migration from the non-Russian
states can really be seen as two different manifestations of the same migration stream - a return
migration to the central core of population settlement in European Russia. Though there were
signs of migration from the periphery regions in the late 1980s and early 1990s,  this migration
began in earnest in 1992  when prices were liberalized and the devolution process from the central
to regional government began (figure 5). Further investigation of the causes of migration is
presented below. It appears that population mobility during transition in Russia has declined due
to the hardships of the transition. The number of people moving declined from 6.3 per hundred
people in 1988 to 3.0 in 1994.  The reason for the large population declines in a period of reduced
migration turnover in regions such as those in the North are that those who are leaving are not
replaced by newcomers as was the case in the past.
42.  As can be clearly seen in figure 6, from the 1980s to the 1990s, eight of Russia' eleven
economic regions reversed their direction of net migration (from positive to negative or vice-
versa). The Volga-Vytaka, Central Chernozem, Volga, and Urals shifted from net out-migration
to net in-migration and the North, East Siberia, West Siberia, and the Far East - all periphery
regions - shifted from being net recipients of migrants  to net donors. For example, the Far East
region went from experiencing the third highest rate of net in-migration of any economic region
during the 1980s (4.5 per thousand) to having by far the highest rate of out-migration (-10.5 per
thousand during 1989-1995).  Whereas in the past, the number coming to the Far East slightly
27exceeded the number leaving, in the 1990s, three people left the region for every one who
arrived.
43.  Overall from 1989 to 1998, the population of Russia stayed practically the same with the
excess of deaths over births being matched by the return migration to Russia. Over this period,
half (44 of 89) the regions of Russia experienced population declines. The causes of the decline
varied among the different areas of the country. Regions in the more densely populated, western
portion of the country experience population declines because of highly negative rates of natural
increase while those in the peripheral regions in the North, Siberia, and the Far East experienced
declines because of out-migration. The following table shows the dichotomous population
change trend between the North and non-North regions of Russia over the period 1989-1998:
(thousands)  Russia  North  Non-North
Total population change  -296  -690  394
Natural increase  -3,224  223  -3,447
Migration  2,928  -913  3,841
44.  The population of the Russian North, as defined in this study, peaked in 1991 at 9,826
thousand at which time this represented 6.6 percent of the entire Russian population. Between
1989 and 1999 the population of North has declined by 7.9 percent (see table 4). The North
unlike Russia, has had more births than deaths over this period, so the net out-migration  has been
even larger than the overall population decline. Since 1989, over one of every ten persons
representing 10.2 percent of the population or a total of nearly a million persons has left the
North. Only two regions in the North (the Karelian Republic and the Khanty-Mansiy  Okrug)
experienced in-migration, all of the other Northern regions had out-migration, in most cases
rather substantial out-migration. Ten of the sixteen regions had had out-migration of over 10
percent of their 1989 populations. Eight of these regions had between 10 and 20 percent of their
populations leave. In the far northeast corner of Russia, over a third of the population of
Magadan and half of the population of Chukotka choose migration as a strategy of adaptation to
changing circumstances. The peak year of out-migration from the North was 1992, the year the
Soviet Union broke up and prices were liberalized in Russia, and the beginning of the period of
fiscal decentralization (figure 7). In that year, there was a net out-migration of 200 thousand
persons from the North. Migration from the North continues but in 1996 had slowed to one-third
of what is in 1992.  However, net migration to the North had been slowing down since peaking in
the mid-1980s.  The mid-1980s were the period of economic liberalization instituted by
28Gorbachev. It was also when academics, as well as policy-makers,  began to question the massive
levels of investment devoted to the Northern regions.
45.  Analysis of data on in and out-rnigration  to and from the North reveal some interesting
trends (data are available for the period 1993 to 1996). While the net migration (the difference
between in migration and out migration) from the North has declined since peaking in 1992,  the
number of people going to the North has increased slightly, much of this driven by the migration
trends between the North and the non-Russian states of the FSU. The ratio of those leaving the
North to those arriving in the North has declined, from 1.72 departures per arrival in 1993 to 1.39
in 1996.  While this hardly approaches the pre-transition situation in the North where there were
Figure  7: Net  M igration  in the
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more people coming to the region than leaving it, the trend is in the direction of a zero migration
balance. The net migration exchange between the North and other regions of Russia was roughly
the same in 1996 as it was in 1993. There has been a large increase of persons coming to the
North from other regions of Russia but an equally large increase in the number departing for the
materik.9
9  The term  materik  means  mainland  in Russian  and is often  used  by those in  the North  to refer  to the non-
Northern  regions  of the country  in manner  similar  to that  which  Alaskans  refer  to the 'lower  48' or
'outside'.
29Table 4: Population Trends in the Russian North, 1989-1999  (beginning-of-year; in thousands)
Total  population  Percent  change,  1989-1999  Absolute  change,  1989-1999
Natural  natural
Region  1989  1999  Total  Increase  migration  Total  increase  migration
RUSSIANFEDERATION  147.401  146,693  -0.5  -2.7  2.2  -707  -3,929  3,222
The North  9,711  8.945  -7.9  2.4  -10.2  -766  229  -995
Karelian Republic  791  772  -2.4  -3.1  0.8  -19  -25  6
Kormi  Republic  1,261  1,149  -8.9  0.8  -9.6  -112  10  -121
Arkhangel'sk  Oblast  1,570  1,479  -5.8  -2.0  -3.8  -91  -32  -60
Nenets Autonomous Okrug*  55  46  -15.6  4.5  -20.2  -9  2  -11
MurmanskOblast  1,147  1.000  -12.8  0.5  -13.3  -147  6  -153
Khanty-Mansiy Aut. Okrug *  1,268  1,370  8.0  7.0  1.0  102  89  13
Yamal-Nenets Aut. Okrug *  486  498  2.5  8.9  -6.4  12  43  -31
Tuva Republic  309  311  0.7  9.8  -9.1  2  30  -28
Taymyr Autonomous Okrug *  55  44  -20.7  4.3  -25.0  -11  2  -14
Evenki Autonomous Okrug *  24  19  -20.8  5.6  -26.4  -5  1  -6
Sakha Republic (Yakutia)  1,081  989  -8.6  7.9  -16.5  -93  86  -178
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug  157  77  -51.1  4.3  -55.5  -80  7  -87
Kamchatka Oblast  466  390  -16.3  1.6  -17.9  -76  8  -83
Koryak Autonomous Okrug *  39  30  -22.6  2.6  -25.1  -9  1  -10
Magadan Oblast  386  240  -37.9  1.9  -39.8  -146  7  -153
Sakhalin Oblast  710  608  -14.4  -0.6  -13.8  -102  -4  -98
Equivalent Regions  17,637  17,538  -0.6  0.9  -1.4  -99  153  -252
Perm'Oblast **  3,100  2,979  -3.9  -2.1  -1.8  -121  -66  -55
Komi-Permyak  Aut. Okrug *  160  153  -4.6  -1.3  -3.3  -7  -2  -5
Altay Republic  192  204  6.2  3.9  2.3  12  8  4
TomskOblast  1,002  1,072  7.0  -1.2  8.2  70  -12  82
Tyumen'Oblast  3,081  3,226  4.7  4.1  0.6  145  126  19
Buryat Republic  1,041  1,041  0.0  2.9  -2.9  0  30  -30
Krasnoyarsk Kray  3,027  3,063  1.2  -0.9  2.1  36  -26  63
Irkutsk Oblast  2,831  2,764  -2.4  0.2  -2.6  -67  6  -73
Chita Oblast  1,378  1,269  -7.9  2.4  -10.3  -109  33  -143
Primorskiy Kray  2.258  2,197  -2.7  -0.7  -2.0  -62  -16  -46
Khabarovsk Kray  1,609  1.534  -4.7  -0.4  -4.3  -75  -6  -69
Amur Oblast  1,058  1,015  -4.0  1.2  -5.2  -43  12  -55
Sources and notes:
"The North" as defined here are the sixteen regions designated as such in the study. "Equivalent  regions" are those regions
that fall partly into regions equivalent to the Far North as designated by the Russian government.
* Data for these areas also included in larger geographic unit which they are part of.
** Data for the Perm Oblast are not included in the totals for equivalent regions.
Data based upon annual Goskomstat data for the population, births, and deaths for each region. Net migration computed
via residual method.
46.  In 1993 (and probably also in 1992 and earlier) people were simply leaving the North for
other regions of Russia of other FSU countries. Many of those going to the non-Russian states
were titular members of those states worried about not being able to obtain citizenship or other
benefits if they stayed in Russia. Keep in mind that roughly 11 percent of the population of the
30North were Ukrainians or Belarussians and in some regions, their share of the population was
close to 20 percent. The migration exchange between the North and foreign countries reversed
itself in 1994,  when 46 thousand more people arrived in the North from the non-FSU states than
departed to them. The exchange has remained positive ever since. The number arriving in the
North from the other states has remained somewhat  constant but the number leaving the North to
the non-Russian regions of the FSU has declined in half between 1993 and 1996. Overall during
the period, more people have arrived in the North from each FSU country than have left with two
exceptions, Ukraine and Belarus.
47.  By 1996, nearly all sixteen regions had the same direction of migration exchange with
the non-Russian states and the rest of Russia, albeit at varying levels. All but one had overall out
migration (Karelia had roughly the same number of arrivals as departures), all had out migration
to the rest of Russia, and all but two (Chukotka and Sakhalin) had in migration from the non-
Russian states. Just two regions, the Khanty-Mansiy  and Yamal-Nenets okrugs in west Siberia
accounted for 60 percent of the total net in-migration  to the North in 1996. The migration
turnover rate (the percent of all persons who move) has remained relatively constant in the North
with the exception of these two regions where it has increased dramatically. There has been a
large increase in the number of persons who are both arriving to these regions as well as leaving.
One possible explanation is that with the amount of both foreign and domestic investment in
these two regions (as well as World Bank loans) perhaps the labor force is restructuring resulting
in increased turnover.
48.  This includes only those migrants who have left the Far North as defined in this study
and does not include those who have migrate to another location in the same oblast-level unit or
those who have moved to another Northern region. There were a total of 2,350,918 persons who
migrated from these Northern regions to other regions of Russia between 1989 and 1996.
Regions where there was a concentration of Northern migrants (over 40,000 between 1989 and
1996) were along the southern border of Siberia, in the regions bordering the European North
(the Vologda and Leningrad oblasts and St. Petersburg), and in several oblast along the Volga
and in the North Caucasus.
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In  40,001 to 90,000  [f3lNorthern  regions49.  Three regions received over 90,000 Northern migrants  over this period (figure 8). The
Krasnodar Kray in the North Caucasus received the most Northern migrants, 148 thousand or 6.3
percent of the total. During the transition period, this region has become a magnet for those
migrants returning from the 'near abroad' following the breakup of the Soviet Union as well as
for migrants from other regions of Russia, including from the Northern regions. St. Petersburg
received the second largest number of Northern migrants. This is not surprising for a number of
reasons, one is the simple gravity effect of being the country's second largest city and the second
is that it is a Northern city itself (the 60th  north parallel runs directly through the city) and is
located in close proximity to the European North. Bashkortostan also was also the destination
choice of over 90,000 Northern migrants. In 1989, there were nearly 50,000 Bashkirs and a total
of 171,000  persons who were born in Bashkortostan living in the North. There were a further 21
regions that received between 40,000 and 90,000 Northern migrants. The remaining  45, non-
Northern regions received less than 40,000.
50.  The urban population in the North declined by 5.4 percent while the rural population
declined by just 1 percent, which is not surprising. There are four primary reasons for this: the
majority of the Northern population and econornic activity is concentrated in urban areas; the
decline in natural increase in Russia has disproportionally affected urban populations; the rural
population in the North is primarily composed of indigenous peoples who are unlikely to move;
and the overall withdrawal  of subsidies to the Northern regions has disproportional affected
urban populations.
51.  While there was overall population decline in the North there was considerable variation
among the sixteen oblast-level units in the study in the size of this decline over the period 1989
to 1999.  These ranged from the Khanty-Mansiy Okrug, which actually grew by 8.0 percent to the
Chukotka Okrug which, declined by 51.1 percent. At the lower geographic level of rayons and
urban settlements, there is even further variation. Unfortunately,  at this level there is less data to
correlate population change and migration with. In fact, it is difficult to compile a comprehensive
data set that allows population change to be disaggregated into natural increase and migration. At
the one extreme are several rayons that lost half or more of their populations between 1991 and
1997. Most of these are rather small, rural rayons in Magadan, Chukotka, or Yakutiya. There are
numerous small settlements scattered throughout the North, whose economic base is extremely
tenuous in the new conditions. For instance, of the forty-three monopoly towns in the North, 80
percent of them have lost population since 1991. Of the twenty-seven with over half of industrial
33employment in one branch, all but three showed population declines. The compilation of a list of
all Northern settlements and analysis of the underlying economic conditions of these would
require further research but would be extremely useful for the policy implications it would
provide. The Russian State Committee for Northern Development (Goskomsever)  has already
begun work on analysis of this type.
52.  The settlement or rayon of any size that showed the largest population decline was
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy,  the capital of the Kamchakta oblast, where the population declined
by a quarter, going from 284,900 in 1991 to 210,100 in 1998 (table 5). The economy of the city
is based upon fishing and fish processing and 60 percent of industrial employment is
concentrated in one fish processing plant. There were several large urban settlements in the
Northern that actually showed rather considerable population increases. Of the sixteen largest
urban settlements in the North, a quarter of them actually had populations increases -
Petrozavodsk, (Karelian Republic), Syktyvkar,  (Komi Republic), Surgut (Khanti-Mansiy Okrug),
and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk,  (Sakhalin). Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk,  the oblast center of Sakhalin, oblast is
an interesting case it grew by 9 percent between 1991 and 1997,  the most of any of the large
Northern cities. The oblast as whole declined by 11.7 percent, all entirely due to out-migration.
The population of every other rayon and city in Sahkalin except the oblast center, declined in
population over this period. The region as a whole is the cite of considerable investment in its
onshore and offshore oil reserves and presumably the majority of this is generating jobs and
population growth in the capital only.
53.  Surgut is the center of much of the oil exploration taking place in the Khanty-Mansiy
Okrug. Petrozavodsk is the oblast center of Karelia, the only Northern region to have net
immigration over the period. It has a more diverse economy based upon machine building.
Syktyvkar, the oblast center of the Komi region, also has a more diverse economy than other
large Northern urban centers and may be a destination region for some of the out-migration  from
Vorkuta, the coal region located in the Northern portion of the region, which has lost 17 percent
of its population. The population of the largest Northern city in Russia, Murmansk, declined by
16.6 percent between 1991 and 1997. The economy of the city rests on fishing and fish
processing, some mineral exploration, and is home to the North Sea Fleet. Archangelsk lost about
12 percent of its population over this period. Magadan city, in the Far East, lost just over one in
five persons. The city was founded in the 1930s to support the Kolyma mining activities and was
once one of the harshest and deadliest forced labor camps in the Soviet penal system.
34Table 5: Population Change in the Cities Over 100,000 in the Russian North, 1991-1998
Total population  Percent  Absolute
(thousands)  Change,  change
City (Region)  1991  1998  1991-98  (thousands)
Murmansk (Murmansk)  472.9  388.3  -17.9  -84.6
Arkhangel'sk (Arkhangel'sk)  428.2  375.4  -12.3  -52.8
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy (Kamchatka)  284.9  210.1  -26.3  -74.8
Petrozavodsk (Karelia)  278.2  282.8  1.7  4.6
Noril'sk (Krasnoyarsk)  *  264.7  245.7  -7.2  -19.0
Surgut (Khanty-Mansiy  Aut. Okrug)  261.1  274.8  5.2  13.7
Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk)  254.1  236.2  -7.0  -17.9
Nizhnevartovsk (Khanty-Mansiy  Aut. Okrug)  247.4  235.7  -4.7  -11.7
Syktyvkar (Komi Republic)  240.0  247.6  3.2  7.6
Yakutsk (Sakha Republic)  225.2  225.5  0.1  0.3
Vorkuta (Komi Republic)  216.8  175.8  -18.9  -41.0
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk  (Sakhalin)  172.9  187.8  8.6  14.9
Magadan (Magadan)  166.8  130.4  -21.8  -36.4
Ukhta (Komi Republic)  141.9  129.6  -8.7  -12.3
Neryungri (Sakha Republic)  121.2  108.6  -10.4  -12.6
Novyy Urengoy (Yamal-Nenets  Aut. Okrug)  105.5  99.5  -5.7  -6.0
Sources and notes:
1991 population figures: Goskomstat RSFSR, Chislennost'  naseleniya RSFSR po gorodam,
Rabochim poselkam i rayonam na 1 yanvarya 1991 population figures: Goskomstat  Rossii
Chislennost' naseleniya Rossiyskoy  Federatsii po gorodam,  poselkam gorodskogo tipa i rayonam
na I yanvarya 1998 g., Moscow: 1998. Data are for the present (nalichnoye)  population.
Some of the population changes may be the result of annexations or de-annexations. It cannot be
Determined in every case whether there was a change in rayon or city boundaries over the time
period.
* Norilsk is physically located in the Taymyr  Autonomous Okrug but administratively  subordinate
to the Krasnoyarsk Kray.
54.  The breakup  of the Soviet Union and the economic  transition  has  spurred a number of
large migration  streams among  and within the fifteen  successor  states. Table  6 shows the relative
size of the  migration  from the North  in comparison  to other major post-Soviet  migration  streams
in Russia.  The data show that migration  from the North  during  the period  from  1989 to 1996 was
larger  than any  of the return migration  streams to Russia from  the other FSU states.  Each of the
migration  streams needs to be put into context  by the counter  stream of people  moving in the
opposite  direction.  The migration  from the western  FSU  (Ukraine,  Belarus,  and Moldova)  was
nearly  as large  as the migration  from the North  but balanced  by a migration  nearly as large from
Russia to these  states. The return  migration  from the remaining  states  back to Russia  was more
35unidirectional. There were four people who left from the Central Asian states (excluding
Kazakhstan) and the Transcaucasus for every one person who went from Russia to these states.
Data on both and immigration and out-migration  for a shorter period for the North which show
that from 1993 to 1996, for every three people leaving the North, there were two who migrated to
the North. The out-migration  from the North represents about a quarter of the 1989 population
but as was mentioned is being replaced by a large counter stream of people moving to the
Northern regions. For the years where data are available, the ratio of those leaving to those
migrating to the North has been declining.
Table 6: Major Migration Streams in Russia, 1989-96
Size of migration stream (thousands)
Migration stream  Stream  Counter stream  Net migration
Russian North to Mainland'  2,351
Out of the Russian North, 1993-1996  1,165  775  -389
Return migration to Russia  6,927  3,496  3,431
Kazakhstan to Russia  1,585  604  982
Central Asia to Russia  1,636  408  1,228
Transcaucasus to Russia  1,061  279  782
Baltics to Russia  311  90  222
Western FSU to Russia  2,333  2,116  217
From Russia to Far Abroad'  769  3  -766
Sources  and  notes:
Migration  out of the Russian  North  comprises  migration  out of the Northern  regions  and includes  migration
to the rest of Russia,  the other  FSU states,  and  outside  the FSU.  Return  migration  to Russia  consists  of
migration  from  the 14 non-Russian  states  of the former  Soviet  Union  to Russia.  The western  FSU  consists  of
Ukraine,  Belarus,  and  Moldova.
Data  on migration  between  Russia  and the other  FSU  states  is from  Goskomstat  Rossii,  Demograficheskiy
yezhegodnik  Rossii,  1997,  pp. 504-507.
Migration  data  for the Russian  North  are from  the following  sources:
1993:  Goskomstat  Rossii,  Demograficheskiy  yezhegodnik  Rossiyskoy  Federatsii  1993,  1994,  pp. 384-399.
1994:  Goskomstat  Rossii,  Demograficheskiy  yezhegodnik  Rossiyskoy  Federatsii,  1995,  pp.  404-415.  1995:
Goskomstat  Rossii,  Chislennost'  i migratsiya  naseleniya  Rossiyskoy  Federatsii  v 1995  g. Statisticheskiy
byulleten',  Moscow:  1996,  pp. 28-41. 1996:  Goskomstat  Rossii,  Chislennost'  i migratsiya  naseleniya
Rossiyskoy  Federatsii  v 1996  g. Statisticheskiy  byulleten',  Moscow:  1997,  pp. 28-41.
55.  Profile of Northern Migrants and Mechanisms  for Migration  from  the North: The
discussion above showed that while there has been overall out-migration from the North over the
past several years, that there has been a great deal of variation among regions as to the magnitude
of this migration, ranging from out-migration  of over half the population in Chukotka to a very
small amount of net in-migration in Karelia. There has also been considerable variation among
demographic and social groups in the recent Northern migration, similar to migrations streams
36found elsewhere. The selectivity of migration from the North has consequences  for the migrants
themselves and their ability to adapt in the regions they have migrated to, the recipient regions,
and for the demographic and social structures of the regions in the North they have left behind.
The composition of the migrant groups will also have an impact on the Russian government's
policy towards assistance to others wishing to leave the North. As will be shown below, there are
significant differences among social groups as to how they undertook the actual migration
process. This section analyzes the age-sex composition and educational levels of recent Northern
migrants, the mechanisms that these migrants used, their adaptation to their new environments,
and their opinions about the migration process itself.
56.  This section is based upon two main sources of data. The first are detailed data for the
period 1994 to 1996 on the demographic and social characteristics of migrants from the North
obtained from Goskomstat  Russia which break down the Northern migration streams over this
period by age, sex, and educational level. The second source of data was a survey that was done
of approximately  600 recent Northern migrants  in four recipient regions.
57.  The age-sex structure of migrants from the North for 1994 shown in figure 9 reveal
several large bulges indicating age groups with large numbers of people leaving. There is a large
group of people centered on the retirement age of 55 which should not be surprising for
migration in general nor recent Northern migration  trends. People often move at retirement ages
to places other than where they worked a majority of their careers. There is a large bulge
centered on age 33, the middle of the prime working ages. There is a smaller bulge around age 6,
which presumably represents the children of this working-age  group that is leaving. There is also
a large spike at ages 17-18, the age at which most Russian children complete their compulsory
schooling. Much of this is due to the lack of higher educational facilities in the North where
those who want can complete their schooling.
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58.  More revealing than the figures on gross out-migrants are those on net migration by age
(the difference between those coming to the North and those leaving). Again the spike around
ages 17-18 indicate that many more people of these ages are leaving than comning  to the North.
The only ages where there is positive net migration to the North are between ages 19 and 23.
These are young workers who are just completing their specialized secondary or higher schooling
and are typically in their first professional jobs. Moving up the age structure, migration turns
negative again at age 24 and deepens with the same bulge around age 33 as seen in the figure of
gross out-miigrants  from the North. There is the same bulge of out-migrants around the retirement
age of 55. Migration continues to be negative moving up the age structure although less
dramatically so because of the lesser number of total miigrants  in the higher ages. What is not
38known is how this age structure of net migration  to the North in 1994 differed from that before
1988 when the net migration to the North was positive.
59.  The effects of this age-specific out migration can clearly be seen by comparing the age
structures both before (1989) and after (1997) the large outflows (figure 10). Overall, the North
had a population decline of 6.3 percent between 1989 and 1997. There are far fewer young
children below age 10 and young adults between the ages of 25 and 40 in 1997 than in 1989.
There has been a large increase in the number of those in the young retirement ages and smaller
increases in the older ages. The number of children below age 10 in the North has declined by 35
percent. The share that this cohort constituted of the population declined from 19.4 to 13.5
percent of the population. The number of young adults between 25 and 39 declined by 24 percent
and their share of the population fell from 31.5 percent to 25.6 percent. On a broader level, the
number of school-age persons has declined by 29 percent. The working-age  population fell by 15
percent and the retirement age population increased by 9 percent over the past eight years,
indicating  that there is a significant build up of retirement age persons who would like to leave
but are not able to do so.
Figure  10: Age Structure  of the
North, 1989  and 1997
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60.  The number of those in the early retirement ages, 55 to 59, increased by 35 percent, those
65 to 69 increased by 74 percent, and those 70 to 74 by 55 percent. A very small portion of these
increases are attributable to an aging of the population but what they most clearly point to is the
system of assisting people to move out of the North upon retirement has clearly broken down.
39Savings have been wiped out by inflation and budget-supported  benefits for moving and
transport assistance and the purchase of a flat in the mainland upon retirement are seldom paid.
61.  As figure 11 clearly shows the number of people leaving the North exceeds the number
corning to the North at every educational level. Given that the Northern regions experienced
overall out migration over the period, the question is whether this migration was
disproportionally of the more educated population -- and the answer is yes. Thus, the Northern
regions are clearly losing educated people in disproportionate numbers. It is those with higher
education, presumably those more skilled and knowledgeable, who are using migration as an
adaptation strategy and who have the means to be able to move. Only the ratio of departures to
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arrivals of those with a primary education is less than the overall ratio, indicating that the less
educated are either less inclined or less able to migrate. The pattern of disproportionate numbers
of educated people leaving the North persisted, in varying degrees, among regions. In Northern
regions of high out-migration such as Chukotka and Madagan, there were four to five persons
with higher or specialized secondary education leaving for each person with comparable
education arriving.
4062.  A source of detailed micro data on recent migrants from the North was a survey
commissioned of such people in four recipient regions -Pskov, Rostov, Bashkortostan, and
Novosibirsk. The survey consisted of 130 questions to 581 people who migrated from the North
over the period 1992 to 1997. Questions were asked about basic demographic characteristics,
motivation for moving to the North originally, life while living in the North, reasons for leaving,
the actual migration process, adaptation to the new environment, and any assistance received in
the migration process. Assessments were also made of the environment in the recipient regions
and attitudes of local officials towards migrants. This section summarizes the main findings of
that survey and its implications.' 1
Table 7: Main  reasons  to leave the North  (max. three answers  possible)
We always viewed our stay in the North as  29  9  33  1441
temporary
U#nm.n  stostayiNlhoN&tb  27  '2,  U27  3  4
Wanted to get back to our native place, relatives,  23  6  28  21  42
friends
flc ifbEalth  de<*  .ts 2  X  <  iexiomte  19  M  %>  E*  0%  4  J
The Northem climate is too bad  19  19  19  15  42
g(mymIativs)nimu  15  02  84  14  5
To obtain education, give education to the  14  31  11  23  32
children
An~~~~~~~~~~  24
Lost the job because  of closing or downsizing of  10  7  11  23  41
the company
Relatives/friends/acquaintances  already  6  9  5  25  38
migrated from the North and had a positive
expenlence
Solve housing problem  4  11  3
63.  The major difficulty in conducting the survey was in finding respondents partly because
of the lack of a centralized register of Northern migrants. Thus, the sample does not pretend to be
a perfect sample of recent Northern migrants but is fairly representative. The age structure of the
sample versus macro data on the age of Northern migrants matches very closely. The sample is
slightly skewed away from persons with higher education and towards persons with a specialized
10  A more  detailed  discussion  of the findings  and more  complete  results  of the survey  can be found  in  the
main  report  and  append  of Netherlands  Economic  Institute,  Migration  from  the Russian  North:  Profile,
mechanisms  of migration  and adjustment  in recipient  regions, Rotterdam,  Moscow:  May  1998.
41secondary education. The geographic distribution of migrants according to the Northern regions
they departed from is fairly close but obviously does not match exactly the macro migration data.
64.  Not surprisingly, over half (52 percent) of respondents went to the North originally in
order to earn money. Most of the people in the sample (84 percent) were not born in the North,
and went there during the period when there was a program of privileges guaranteed by the state
(and funded) for Northern migrants. Another third, mostly females, went along with their spouses
or parents. Thus, the desire to accumulate savings or connection to a family member with that
desire prompted the vast majority of Northern migrants. The motivation given by the next largest
group of respondents was romanticism or a desire to see the world (13 percent).
65.  The decline in extra-monetary rewards for the hardships of living in the North in the
major reason persons in the sample left. Reasons such as "it became senseless to stay in the
North", a desire to return 'home', or the fact that most never viewed staying in the North as
permanent predominated the responses of those who have left recently (table 7). Enterprise
closings or downsizing were cited by 10 percent of respondents, significant but not as high as
expected. Even among Northern 'natives', who would presumably view the region as their home,
the futility of living there was a predominant response." For this group, the desire to obtain
education for themselves or their children was the most common  response. This is not surprising
given the lack of educational facilities in the North. This accounts for the large spike in the age
pyramid of Northern migrants around ages 17-18, when people complete their compulsory
schooling. Among the four recipient regions, the share of those wanting to return to ones native
place was highest those in Baskhortostan, the ethnic homeland of the Bashkirs. This result is not
surprising given the strong pull of natives towards their ethnic regions within the Russian
Federation.
66.  The pull factors for destination choice of the Northern migrants in the sample are
presented in table 8. The choices were usually not random as most moved to either the region
they were born or places where they had relatives or friends already living. About half of
1The term 'natives'  in this  case  refers  to persons  born  in the North,  not members  of the Northern  titular
groups.  Only  6 persons,  or I percent,  of the sample  were  members  of Northern  ethnic  groups.  Seventy-two
percent  of the sample  were  Russians,  followed  by Tatars  (12  percent),  and  Bashkirs  (7.4 percent).
Ukrainians  (4 percent)  and  Belarussians  (0.9 percent)  made  up much  smaller  shares  of the sample  of
Northern  migrants  than  their  respective  shares  of the Northern  population  because  presumably  many
returned  to their  ethnic  homelands  outside  of Russia.
42respondents were born in the region they moved to. An interesting note is the fact almost none
(1.5 percent) of the migrants who moved to their native region participated in an organized
migration program (more on these below). An indication that assistance programs for Northern
migrants fails to take into account location preferences.
Table  8: Reasons for choice of place of settlement  (N=582)
Our parents, relatives, friends live (lived) here  62  5  1  64  76  56
(3)
lieSmychial$6;beoeKittot  ½; f  ;;.S  Dtl  i4  33  |t:t  . -t 0
Climate, environment are good here (10)  20  27  31  1  5  10
Adwelll4wasrc  Ms  sene  r13-5  1  7  l4  24  14
Our acquaintances have a good opinion of this  10  8  6  5  21
place (2)
Re-settlement here was organised by our  7  23  6  0  0
company (7)
We were provided with a job here (1)  6  6  7  7  3
tt  ,  3 id..  7
We came here practically by chance (12)  4  4  4  3  6
67.  One of the most interesting findings in the survey, which is indicative of both the labor
and housing markets in Russia, is the sequences of actions the sample of migrants undertake
when moving. About two-thirds of migrants (62 percent) first found a dwelling and then a job
(table 9). Only 7 percent found a job first, followed by a place to live. Another 11 percent did
both simultaneously. Given the tightness in the housing market in Russia, most viewed this as the
major obstacle rather than employment. This sequence of actions has consequences for the
situation migrants find themselves in following their move. On a macro level, this indicates that
at least the Northern migration under study is not redistributing labor efficiently because of the
impediments of housing shortages across Russia.
Table 9: Sequence of actions when  choosing  where to move
first found  a dwelling,  then  a job  62
$M M#  i  n  gg29  I20;  000  <|2  I  ^  l  I  t>  t  e00  0  05ui051  0
first  found a job,  then a dwelling  7
FuiidA11.  bwlln  M. ot,jfrutiI6w
for  family reasons  (came to relatives,  parents)  4
Other  8
4368.  Migrants were asked a series of subjective and objective questions about their situation
both before and after migration.  Nearly half consider their present general situation to be worse
than their situation before migration (figure 12). One-third  considers their situation to be the
same, and only 11 percent indicate that they are better off after migration. Prior to migrating,
over 90 percent of respondents indicate that they either lived without limiting themselves (29.6
percent), initially lived well but then their material situation worsened (33.3 percent), or had
enough to purchase all necessities (29.9 percent). Following migration, the situation had
worsened with 42.3 percent indicating that they could afford only necessities, 28.7 percent
stating that they had only enough for food, and 15.8 saying that they could hardly make ends
meet. Evaluations of migrants well-being are obviously influenced by economic development in
Russia in general, where real incomes fell precipitously over the period since 1992, and the
period when they migrated. Recent migrants tended to be a little less negative about their
situation than those who moved in 1992-1994. Overall, most (57 percent) are happy or very
happy that they moved. Only 10 percent regret their decision to move and another 11 percent had
rather not moved. Over seventy percent of the respondents stated that they would almost
certainly not migrate again. However, one rather curious result was that of those who said that
they would migrate again, the largest share, nearly 40 percent, indicate that they would re-
migrate to the North.




1 hard  to say
69.  The housing situation of recent Northern migrants seems comparable to that while they
lived in the North, with roughly equal thirds indicating that their current housing was better,
similar, and worse than what they had in the North. It is the labor market situation of recent
migrants that shows the largest decline. About 90 percent of respondents held permanent jobs
while in the North, while only 60 percent held jobs at the time of the interviews. Another 18
44percent are looking for work, and 22 percent are out of the labor force. This indicates an
unemployment rate of about 22.7 percent for the sample group, a rate much higher than that in
the recipient regions and in Russia overall. The fact that the unemployment rates are higher than
the local rates should not be surprising given the sequence of actions undertaken in the migration
process, finding housing first followed by a job search. The fact that they are that much higher
probably is surprising given that this cohort tends to be more educated and skilled than the
general population.
Table 10:  Working population by economic  activity before and after migration (in  percentage  of working  population)
Mining  17  2
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals production  3
Mechanical engineering  1  I
Construction  10  10
H  44"  BB:g:BB  BBB  .B'.:3  ......
Transportation and communication  9  7
4@MU~~4td~#w><  X  <W  s3stB,  4  4  . >.>  28  J  Bg2  q
trade, mediation, public catering, procurement  13  23
NE  B.B
army,  police, security  5  7
,0  &UB  IN,.3  ABB  S  g  0g  li  gB  3xg  gE  j2
Private services (cleaning,  child care, etc.)  1  2
70.  Of those who have found work, there are significant occupational and structural shifts,
which are not surprising given the different structures of the economies of the North versus the
recipient regions. Overall, about half of the workers have the same kind of job after moving that
they held before migration.  When the present  job differs from the position held in the North, the
majority indicates that they are working below their capabilities. There was a large decline in the
number that worked as managers (top or medium) or highly-skilled specialists and an increase in
the number working as entrepreneurs (table 10). Again, some of this trend can be attributed to the
overall increase in entrepreneurial opportunities in the country and some to more opportunities in
the mainland than what existed in the North. The average company size the respondents presently
work in versus that which they worked in while in the North has declined considerably. As table
10 shows, the structure of employment of migrants has changed reflecting the relative different
structure of the Northern economy based on primary extraction versus the economies of the
45recipient regions. Employment in mining, energy, and metal production showed large declines
while employment by migrants in trade, catering, services, and agriculture increased.
71.  Of those in the sample, only 7 percent participated in a migration program. Those who
participated in a migration program tended to be older, less educated, and more often female than
so-called spontaneous migrants (table 11). The major reasons cited for non-participation were
lack of awareness (54 percent), and a preference to move on their own (29 percent). Once
included in the programs, the benefits tended to be rather substantial including a place to move
to, a dwelling when the migrants arrived there, transport of goods, necessary documentation, and
in about half the cases, cash assistance. The waiting lists for the programs tended to be relatively
short (about half did not have a waiting list, while another 30 waited less than 6 months) but the
eligibility criteria for getting into the programs tended to be rather strict discouraging many from
even applying. About a third of the programs were for re-settlement of pensioners from the
North, a quarter programs associated with the liquidation of settlements and 13 percent were
programs of Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine. Given the small sample, it is impossible
to evaluate individual programs but overall the results were mixed with equal thirds expressing
satisfaction, dissatisfaction, or no opinion of the migration assistance programs.
Table 11: Characteristics of migrants, organised versus spontaneous.
Average age (in years)  47.4  39.6  40.2
Percentage  female  63.4  53.5  54.2
Percentage employed in North  92.7  89.4  89.6
Percentage under seconday  education  14.6  6,5  7.1
(I. 2 or 3 on N7)
Average year of departure  1995.3  1994.9  1994.9
Total (number of cases)  100 (N-4)  I  100 fNVS40)  100 (N-581)
72.  Overall, Northern migrants constitute rather small portions of the total migrants to the
recipient regions, on average about 13 percent, thus their impact on any region should be rather
minimal. There are differences among the four recipient regions in the survey as there among all
regions in the Russian 'mainland'.  Pskov, in Northwest Russia, tends to be a rather depressed
region with much a higher unemployment rate than the other regions. During the transition
period, Rostov in the North Caucasus, along with neighboring Krasnodar and Stavropol are being
magnets for migrants from the North, elsewhere in Russia, and immigrants from the non-Russian
states. Bashkortostan is, of course, the ethnic homeland of the Bashkirs with the ethnic
composition being 40 percent Russian and 22 percent Bashkir. Novosibirsk is the largest city in
46Siberia. Attitudes of local officials towards migrants from the North, and elsewhere, have to do
with the economic situation in the region, whether migrants are seen as a boom or burden on the
local economy, and whether migrants are seen as compensating for the negative natural increase
being experienced across Russia and in all of the recipient regions. According to site visits and
discussions with officials in all four regions, those in Pskov and Novosibirsk claim to be open
and accommodating  to migrants, while those in Rostov and Bashkortostan tend to be rather
negative about receiving migrants. Respondents confirm these official attitudes when asked
about their treatment by local authorities.
73.  What Caused the Mass Migration from  the North?: To this point, much of the analysis
of post-Soviet, Northern migration trends has been rather descriptive. This section turns to
analysis of what caused this large-scale migration from the North at a time when the country was
attempting to make the transformation away from a centrally planned to a market economy. As
will be shown, the recent patterns of Northern migration are rather predicable when analyzed
against migration theory. Obviously events such as a country attempting to make the transition
away from central planning and the appearance of new states created out of previously existing
ones are not factors that migration theory has had to previously incorporate. However, when
these trends and the influences that they have had on the Northern regions and the people living
in them are broken down into their component elements, not much of the migration from the
North should have come as a surprise.
74.  This is not the same as saying that, in 1991, the leadership of the newly independent
Russian state planned or was even aware that by instituting the various elements of a market
economy would have the effect of depopulating the country's Northern periphery. For the entire
period of the Soviet Union's existence, the population of the Russian North was growing in both
absolute terms and as a share of the country's population. When Russia became independent in
1992, the government  initiated a number of processes transforming the economy towards one
based on market principles. These included liberalization of prices, privatization of many sectors
of the economy, reduction of government subsidies, and the opening of the country to foreign
trade and investment. One unintended by-product of these initiatives was to start a large-scale
migration from the North. Economies and societies are far too complex to foresee all of the
influences that policies undertaken by national governments will have. When the planks of a
market economy were being put in place by the Russian government, there was probably nobody
who foresaw the effect this would have on the Northern regions.
4775.  There are a number of complimentary  theories that explain the migration process. Most
of these are expansions on the so-called push-pull theories put forward by Ravenstein describing
migration in late 19t"  century England. Some people are pushed out of the region they are living
for various reasons and then are pulled towards somewhere else, in an effort to improve their
standard of living. The potential migrants perform a cost-benefit analysis by weighing the push
and pull factors and move if the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. If the perceived income in
other locations exceed the benefits in the present location by more than the cost of making the
move, the person is likely to migrate, incorporating all costs including monetary, opportunity,
and psychic. As will be shown, what drove much of the rapid migration from the North was that
the variables in this cost-benefit calculation changed rather quickly when the transition period
began.
76.  There are intervening obstacles that may inhibit migration.  These include the cost of
moving, legal barriers, and distance to destination. The latter is derived from gravity models of
migration that states that the quantity of migration  between two places decreases as the distance
between two locations increases. The general theory states that as the transportation and
technology advance, the frictional effect of distance decreases, presumably because the cost of
distance has decreased. The opposite must also be true and is evident in present-day Russia and
especially in distant Northern regions as the cost of transportation has increased dramatically
with the withdrawals of subsidies to the transport sector. The various migration theories
conceptualize the process that individuals go through, the characteristics of regions, and why
some tend to be areas of large out-migration  and others magnets for in-migration, and the effects
that regions have on individuals. These theories are useful for assessing the possible future levels
of migration from the Russian North.
77.  Most of the internal migration  that occurred during the Soviet period was rather
predicable according to theory and there was not a unique 'Soviet' or 'centrally planned'
migration system underway. There were however, a few exceptions to standard theory, especially
migration to the periphery regions of the Soviet Union, such as the North. Simple gravity models
and gravity models with a few extensions predict much of the migration flows that occurred in
the Soviet Union.' 2 When variables for investment and service sector amenities were added, the
explanatory values of the models increased considerably. However, migration flows to East
12  Mitchneck,  Beth  A., "Geographical  and  Economic  Determinants  of Interregional  Migration  in the
USSR",  Soviet Geography, March  1991,  pp. 168-189.
48Siberia and the Far East exceeded their predicted values in the models. This was likely due to
two factors. One was their distance from other population centers in Russia and the fact that
subsidized transportation costs did not cause as much 'friction' on distance as theorized. The
second was that the Northern coefficients, which were great inducements to migrate, were not
properly reflected in the models. The high wage rate paid in these regions was not reflective of
higher labor productivity but was a political incentive.' 3 These areas were also recipients of
priority investment. Thus, the population redistribution policies pursued by the Soviet
government were effective, though not necessarily efficient, causing excess labor supply in many
Northern regions. As real wages in the North move closer to those in the south, labor flows from
the region can be expected, and are in fact occurring. The full employment policy pursued by the
Soviet govemment also retarded the influence that regional employment changes might have
otherwise had on migration outside of a workers' place of residence.
78.  Certain groups have a higher degree of migratability -their propensity to use migration
as a strategy of adaptation is higher than.others. People in certain cultures or countries have a
much higher degree of mobility than others. People in the United States, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand, which are countries composed of migrants, tend to have rather high degrees of
mobility. Countries like the Soviet Union/Russia tended to have much lower mobility rates for a
variety of cultural and social reasons. However, within the Soviet Union, there were certain
ethnic groups that had a much higher propensity to migrate than others. Among the mobile ethnic
groups were Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, and Tatars.' 4 It was these groups who comprised the
mass migration during the Soviet period to the non-Russian states and to the periphery areas
within Russia such as the North and Siberia. Ethnic groups such as most Central Asian
nationalities, most of those groups with homelands in the Soviet Union, and the titular groups of
Siberia and the North, tended to have rather low mobility rates. It is the Russians and other
Slavic groups who are leaving the North in the largest numbers. According to the survey-of
recent migrants from the North, 72 percent were Russian and 77 percent were Slavic. In 1989,
their shares of the total Northern population were 71 and 81 percent respectively. Also in the
survey, only 6 of 600 were members of either the ethnic groups indigenous to the North or
Siberia, or these only 1 was a member of the 'small-numbered peoples of the North'. The
13 Kumo,  Kazuhiro,  "Economic  System  Conversion  and  Migration  Transition  in Russia",  review of urban
and regional development studies, 9 (1997), pp. 20-36.
14 Lewis,  Robert  A., Richard  H. Rowland,  and Ralph  S. Clem,  Nationality  and  Population  Change  in
Russia and the USSR:  An Evaluation of Census Data, 1897-1970, Praeger Publishers, Inc. 1970
49expectation is that any further out-migration  from the North will be composed primarily of these
groups that have already left and that most members of the indigenous groups will remain.
79.  There is also migration selectivity by age, educational level, and level of urbanization. In
most societies, young adults are far more likely to migrate  than people are at other ages. More
educated people have a higher likelihood of migrating  than those less educated. People living in
urban areas tend to migrate more than rural residents. This can be clearly seen in data on
migrants to the North, as well as on recent migrants from the North. Because the North is
predominantly a region of newcomers, the age structure was skewed towards persons in the
younger ages. On average, the Northern population was also more educated than Russia as a
whole. The percent of the Northern population living in urban areas is higher than the share for
Russia. The urban population in the North is a predominantly highly educated, Slavic one
working in industry, while the rural population trends to be less educated, indigenous, and
pursuing traditional livelihoods. When the migration from the North began in large numbers in
the early 1990s, it was the highly educated, young adults, living in urban areas who made up the
majority of the streams. Left behind were less educated and older people, who have a lower
migration propensity. There is considerable variation in the number of times a person moves
within his or her lifetime. A small number of people tend to make up a disproportionate amount
of the migration, while others never move. Once a person has used migration as a coping
strategy, they are more likely to use it again.
80.  Even if the propensity and desire to migrate exist, the opportunity structure must also be
present. Even if the push factors in the region of residence are strong, the pull factors in possible
recipient regions must also exist such as job opportunities, adequate housing, and other
amenities. The shortage of housing in Russia has long been cited as a barrier to mobility. This
partly explains why so many of the surveyed migrants looked for housing first and then a job, not
vice-versa as is the case in other countries with more well-functioning housing markets. The
amount of information a person has about the comparative advantages of moving also contributes
to their decision. Lacking sufficient information about possible destinations will make people
less likely to move as this represents an unknown in their cost-benefit analysis. The lack of
sufficient information about possible destinations has been cited as barrier to migration from the
North, as well in Russia in general. Other variables unique to Northern migration that act as
barriers are the enormous distances involved  and the rising cost of transportation that has
resulted from the price liberalization in Russia. It is the largest country in the world and many
50Northern regions are quite distant from population centers in central Russia where many would
like to migrate to.
81.  What characteristics about the Northern regions changed so rapidly and drastically that
caused so many people to 'vote with their feet' and leave when Russia began its transition to a
market economy in the early 1990s? Some of the answer lies in the data shown in table 12 which
shows various economic, investment, labor market, and income characteristics of the Northern
regions versus Russia as a whole. In nominal terms, the per capita gross regional product (GRP)
of the Northern regions is above that of Russia as a whole. However, when the GRP is deflated
by the minimum subsistence level to account for cost-of-living  differences among regions, only
three Northern regions have a GRP above the national average, and two of these have a portion
of their territories outside the North. The only region that lies entirely in the North with a GRP
above the national average is the Komi Republic.
82.  In the 1980s, because of government development  policies towards the North, people
were moving towards regions which were generally less profitable. In 1995, industrial enterprises
in only 3 of the 14 Northern regions, for which data are available, had profitability rates higher
than the national average, and two of these were small, sparsely populated regions, the Koryak
and Evenki Autonomous Okrugs. The share of loss-making enterprises in the North is much
higher than in the rest of the country, 53 percent in the North in 1997 versus 43 percent for
Russia. Only 3 of 18 Northern regions had a share loss-making  enterprises lower than the
national average, and again two of these were small autonomous okrugs. These facts have
obvious labor market and migration implications. The data on investment do not portray a
favorable outlook for future prospects for the North either. Overall in Russia, investment has
fallen by half between 1992 and 1996 and in every single Northern region for which data are
available, the decline in investment has been larger than the national average. According to
migration  theory, migration typically follows investment as it usually translates into increased
employment after a lag period. It was shown above that in the Soviet period, labor migration was
responsive to investment. It is no surprise that the opposite should be true now that investment
levels in the North have declined so dramatically. In 10 of the 16 Northern regions, the share of
investment generated by enterprises own funds is less than the national average. In all except the
oil and gas regions of West Siberia and Yakutia the share of investment coming from the federal
budget is higher than the national average. In the long run, given the financial situation of the
federal government, this will likely lead to further downsizing of Northern enterprises.
51Table 12: Selected Economic and Social Indicators of the Northern  Regions in the 1990s
Gross Regional  Product per  Loss-Making  Capital  Structure  of investment  by source,  Ratio  of average
Capita,  1995 (ths. rubles)  Profitability  Industrial  investment,  1996 (percent)  Ratio  of job  Registered  money
Enterprises  income to
Regionally  Percent  of  in industry,  1997 (share  1996  Federal  Regional  Enterprise  eekers/vacancies.  iemployment  rate  subsistence
1995  of all  minimum,  June
Nominal  deflated  national  (percent)  enterprises)  1992=100  budget  budget  funds  January  1, 1998  January  1, 1998  1997
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  9,562.2  9,562.2  100.0  7.4  43  49.4  9.2  9.6  66.3  6.0  2.7  2.27
The North  53  6.0  10.3  74.4
Karelian Republic  10,245.5  6,485.0  67.8  9.3  63  24.2  8.7  8.7  72.2  61.1  5.9  2.13
Komi Republic  16,250.7  12,043.7  126.0  3.5  60  31.7  11.5  14.6  50.6  22.0  6.2  2.40
Arkhangel'sk Oblast  9,336.3  7,403.3  77.4  7.1  61  18.2  17.6  6.2  50.9  87.8  8.0  1.87
Nenets Autonomous  Okrug  ..  ..  ..  ..  70  ..  10.5  14.9  32.0  40.8  5.5
MurmanskOblast  13,577.0  8,608.1  90.0  6.0  42  19.1  15.8  7.8  73.0  30.3  5.3  2.27
Tyumen' Oblast  34,421.4  23,081.7  241.4  ..  44  31.8  2.3  10.8  81.2  4.6  2.4  4.12
Khanty-Mansiy  Aut. Okrug  ..  ..  ..  5.9  46  ..  2.4  13.4  77.3  7.9  3.3
Yamal-NenetsAut.Okrug  ..  ..  ..  1.9  51  ..  2.2  7.8  85.7  9.2  3.1
TuvaRepublic  3,523.0  2,589.2  27.1  ..  75  7.2  62.5  15.9  19.7  351.7  2.2  0.91
Krasnoyarsk  Kray  14,173.8  15,381.2  160.9  ..  46  42.6  5.8  3.5  82.4  23.2  3.8  2.61
Taymyr Autonomous  Okrug  ..  ..  ..  0.1  0  ..  23.9  8.9  67.2  39.6  4.0
Evenki Autonomous  Okrug  ..  ..  ,,  9.3  33  ..  44.8  43.2  6.4  636.0  5.2
Sakha Republic  (Yakutia)  19,756.0  8,912.4  93.2  6.2  68  29.5  3.0  11.2  40.2  8.6  1.0  1.54
ChukotkaAutonomousOkru  14,138.7  6,550.6  68.5  0.6  77  22.1  57.9  9.6  24.0  71.7  3.4
KamchatkaOblast  12,973.7  6,534.7  68.3  0.9  60  34.2  30.7  10.3  53.8  5.6  3.9  1.66
Koryak Autonomous Okrug  ..  ..  ..  8.2  50  ..  95.4  3.9  0.7  65.8  6.8
Magadan  Oblast  12,555.7  5,817.2  60.8  2.5  58  16.5  14.7  0.8  32.7  9.7  3.2  1.57
SakhalinOblast  10,490.5  5,652.6  59.1  1.7  55  13.4  19.1  4.5  81.8  15.1  3.6  1.51
Sources and notes:
Gross  regional product:  Goskomstat Rossii, Regionay Rossii, 1997,  pp. 370-372.  The regionally deflated  gross regional product figures were computed by the nominal GRP figures by the regional minimum subsisten,
Profitability:  Based upon Drebentsov. Defined  as profits as a share of fixed and working capital.
Loss-making  industrial enterprises:  Goskomstat Rossii, Sever v ekonomike Rossii: Sbomik 1997,  Syktyvkar,  p. 27. Totals for the North are for the enlarged Far North and equivalent regions.
Investment data: Goskomstat Rossii, Sever v ekonomike Rossii: Sbomik 1997, Syktyvkar,  p. 27. Cummulative  index over period was computed by chaining together annual indexes.
Investment by source data: Goskomstat Rossii, Sever v ekonomike Rossii: Sbornik 1997, Syktyvkar,  p. 27. Data do not add to 100. Totals for the North are for the enlarged Far North and equivalent regions.
Revenue and expenditure  data: Ministry of Finance.
Job seekers/vacancies:  Goskomstat Rossii, Regiony Rossii, 1997.
Registered unemployment  rate: Goskomstat Rossii, Rasprostranenyie  dannyie po rezultam vyborochnogo  obsledovaniya naseleniya po problemam zanyatosti, provedennogo  v oktyabre 1995 godu, 1996.
Average incomes, wages, and subsistence minimum: Goskomstat Rossii, Sever v ekonomike Rossii: Sbomik 1997,  pp. 76-77.
Average pension: Goskomstat Rossii, Sotsial'noye polozheniye I uroven's zhizni naseleniya Rossii: Statisticheskiy  sbomik, 1997.
Housing privatization:  Goskomstat Rossii, Regiony Rossii, 1997.
Wages arrears: Goskomstat Rossii, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoye  polozheniye Rossii yanvar' 1998 goda, pp. 289-290.83.  The stress in the labor market caused by the incorporation of the true cost of doing
business in high-latitude regions is becoming clearly evident. At the beginning of 1998, the
registered unemployment  rate was higher than the national average in 14 of 16 Northern regions
and the ratio of job seekers to job vacancies was higher in 15 of 16 regions in the North and in
many cases, much higher. This indicates not only that job prospects are minimal when out of
work in the North but that many unemployed either will not or can not leave the North to seek
work elsewhere. It seems as if people who have a job in the North are doing reasonably well as
the ratio of the average wage to the regional subsistence minimums is higher than the national
average in every Northern region. However, proportional wage arrears seem to be much higher as
well. Roughly a one-fifth of the total wage arrears in the economy were to workers in the North,
which contained only 6 percent of the population. If non-wage incomes are incorporated, the
situation of Northerners is clearly worse. Only 3 of 11 Northern regions have ratios of money
income to subsistence minimum above the national average, evidenced of the lack of alternative
income sources that are so important and found in most other regions of Russia. For pensioners,
the situation is quite abysmal as in only one Northern region does the ratio of average pension to
the subsistence minimum for pensioners exceed the national average. As was seen above, there
has been a build-up of pensioners who would like to leave the North but who lack sufficient
savings to be able to move and establish themselves in a destination region.
84.  Amenity indicators for Northern regions show a similar picture. Rates of housing
privatization are lower than the national average in all Northern regions. Given the overall
housing shortages in Russia, regions with high rates of housing privatization show a positive
correlation as destination regions for in-migration. The Northern shipment which has been an
important source for delivering food, fuel, and other necessary consumer goods has been
drastically cut during the transition period, falling from roughly 2 percent of GDP in 1992 to 0.13
percent in 1997. There are numerous reports with problems in delivering even these reduced
amounts.
85.  In sum, as the high costs of doing business in the difficult climatic conditions of the
North are increasing incorporated into profit equations of enterprises, an inevitable downsizing
of the region's economy is occurring. The new market-based  Russian economy can no longer
afford the scale of Northern development that the centrally-planned Soviet government could.
53This has lead to a shrinking of economic activity in the region and out-migration. Given the
investment trends in the region, coupled with the financial situation caused by the devaluation of
the ruble in August 1998, it seems as if further out-migration  pressures from the North may build.
III. PROJECTIONS  OF FUTURE MIGRATION FROM THE NORTH
86.  How much more migration can be expected from the North and what factors will
influence this migration? When will the population of the North stabilize at its 'correct' size? As
was mentioned above, migration from the North continues but at a considerably slower pace than
its peak in 1994.  There are number of factors that will influence the future population size of the
Northern regions such as level and types of economic activity, which are influenced by levels of
investment, pace of enterprise restructuring and withdrawal  of government subsidies, support
given to those who might want to leave, economic prospects in recipient regions, and also the
overall economic situation in Russia. There will of course be differences among the Northern
regions as to how these factors will interplay to influence patterns and levels of population
growth and migration in the future. This section presents a summary of the Russian government's
official projections of out-migration  from the North, migration potential of individuals as
reflected in a survey of potential migrants from the North, and an examination of the economic
prospects for the Russian North and the impact that this has on migration.
87.  Russian Government Projections of the Northern Population: One source of data on
the possible future migration potential from the North are the population projections done by the
State Committee on Statistics of the Russian Federation (Goskomstat Rossii). The most recent set
contains projections to the year 2010 with a base year of 1995. The projections for the Northern
regions are shown in table 13. According to these projections, the out-migration from the North
is expected to continue and the natural increase is expected to turn negative, resulting in a
population decrease of 600 thousand. Overall, another 583 thousand more persons are expected
to leave the North and there is expected to be a 6.5 population decline between 1995 and 2010.
Four of the 16 Northern regions are projected to actually grow in population size over the
projection period. These are the Khanty-Mansiy and Yamal-Nenets Okrugs of West Siberia,
which actually have been growing moderately over the past few years due to high rates of natural
increase and moderate in-migration. The Tuva Republic in southern Siberia is projected to grow
in population due to a high rate of natural increase. The fact that the Chukotka okrug is expected
to grow is probably more of a statistical artifact of the projection methodology.
54Table 13: The Projected Population of the Russian North, 1995-2010 (end-of-year; thousands)
Total population  Population  change,  1995-2010
Natural
Region  1995  2010  Total  increase  Migration  Percent
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  147,976  143.704  -4,272  -7,550  3,277  -2.9
The North  9,165  8,566  -599  -16  -583  -6.5
Karelian Republic  785  767  -18  -50  32  -2.3
Komi Republic  1,185  1,076  -109  -26  -83  -9.2
Arkhangel'sk Oblast  1,521  1,401  -120  -82  -38  -7.9
Nenets Autonomous Okrug *  48  43  -5  1  -6  -10.6
MurmanskOblast  1,048  885  -163  -53  -110  -15.6
Khanty-Mansiy  Aut. Okrug *  1,331  1,378  47  70  -23  3.5
Yamal-Nenets  Aut. Okrug *  488  598  110  49  61  22.5
Tuva Republic  310  337  27  42  -15  8.8
TaymyrAutonomous Okrug*  47  40  -7  0  -7  -14.0
Evenki Autonomous Okrug *  20  15  -5  1  -6  -26.1
Sakha Republic (Yakutia)  1,023  953  -70  73  -143  -6.8
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug  91  115  25  4  20  27.1
Kamchatka  Oblast  411  322  -89  -11  -78  -21.7
Koryak Autonomous Okrug *  33  23  -10  -1  -9  -29.9
Magadan Oblast  258  192  -66  0  -67  -25.6
Sakhalin Oblast  648  487  -161  -35  -126  -24.8
Equivalent Regions  17,719  17,239  -480  -113  -367  -2.7
Perm'Oblast  3,009  2,883  -126  -179  52  -4.2
Komi-Permyak  Aut. Okrug *  157  112  -45  -9  -37  -28.7
Altay Republic  202  265  63  12  51  31.4
Tomsk Oblast  1,078  1,060  -18  -26  9  -1.6
Tyumen'Oblast  3,170  3,425  255  118  137  8.0
Buryat Republic  1,053  1,064  12  33  -22  1.1
Krasnoyarsk Kray  3,106  2,916  -190  -113  -77  -6.1
Irkutsk Oblast  2,795  2,734  -61  -30  -31  -2.2
Chita Oblast  1,295  1,232  -63  28  -91  -4.9
Primorskiy Kray  2,255  2,051  -204  -77  -127  -9.1
Khabarovsk Kray  1,571  1,389  -182  -47  -135  -11.6
Amur Oblast  1,038  991  -47  -2  -45  -4.5
Sources and notes: Goskomstat Rossii, Ob osnovnykh tendentsiyakh razvitiya demograficheskoy situatsii v Rossii do 2010
goda (doklad), Moscow: 1997.
88.  These four regions which are projected to increase in size ameliorate much of the overall
projected population decline in the North. Nine of the 16 Northern regions are projected to loose
another 10 percent or more of their populations and 5 are projected to show declines of more
than 20 percent, or more than one in five persons. Since the number of births is expected to just
55about equal the number of deaths in the North over the next decade and a half, most of the
population change will be driven by migration  trends.
89.  The limitation of the population projection methodology is that they are typically  only
able to incorporate demographic variables. The influence of economic conditions and other
factors are typically endogenous and are incorporated  through the assumptions regarding future
trends in fertility, mortality, and migration. Because of the volatility of migration, the fact that it
is subject to so many influences, and that it is less constrained by the current age-sex
composition of the population, it is the most difficult of the components of population change to
predict. This is the case in general and is certainly true of projecting the future migration patterns
in the North. To gain a more plausible assessment of possible future migration trends, it is
necessary to assess more closely the underlying economic condition and prospects of the region
under market conditions. It would be best to do this at lower geographic levels of cities and
settlements. Another factor that is difficult to include explicitly into population projections are
any barriers to migration that may exist, and there certainly many among those who wish to
migrate from the North.
90.  Northern Migration Potential and Barriers to Migration: Going beyond demographic
projections, one needs to examine both micro-level  data on individuals living in the North and
their migration intentions and macro-level  data on the Northern economy and the impact that
changes in it will have on migration. In order to ascertain the attitudes of people living in the
North, a survey was conducted of selected groups of potential migrants - pensioners, invalids,
unemployed, and students. Between 400 and 500 members of each of these groups were
interviewed regarding their attitudes towards life in the North, their migration intentions, and
their migrants needs. The survey was conduced in four Northern regions - Vorkuta, Norilsk,
Magadan, and the Nenets Okrug. A summary of the results for each of the four groups is
presented below.
91.  As table 14 shows, nearly half of the pensioners have lived in their place of current
residence for 30 years or longer, and nearly 70 percent have live there for 20 years or more. Very
few were born in the North, indicating a typical pattern in the North of migrating to the region
from elsewhere and staying their most of their careers. Though most had lived in the North for
long periods of time, nearly two-thirds would like to leave the North. Most want to move to be
near family or friends or because of climatic conditions. Only 3.5 percent indicate that they or
56their relatives are financially able to pay for even a portion of transport costs or the costs of
setting themselves up in a new location. This means that 96 percent say that neither they nor their
relatives are able to pay even a portion of the migration expenses. Nearly a third of respondents
indicate that they are a waiting list to migrate, with twenty percent saying that they've been on
such a list between 1 and 5 years. Nearly half of pensioners surveyed (respondents were allowed
to select up to three answers) said that their major migration need was assistance with housing
construction or rent. A quarter of pensioners in the survey estimated the cost of the move would
be between 50,000 and 100,000  rubles (roughly between $8,000 and $16,000 at the exchange
rate prevailing at the time of the survey). Two-thirds indicated that the cost would exceed
100,000 rubles. Seventy-three  percent indicated that they had no savings with which to finance
such a move and another 21 percent said that the savings they did have was insufficient.
92.  Among the invalids in the survey, higher proportions were born in the North than the
pensioners surveyed, 30 percent versus 13 percent. Of those not born in the North, most had lived
there for a long time, with half having lived there between 10 and 30 years. Sixty-eight percent
would like to leave the North, a rather high share given that 30 percent had been born in the
North. Nearly sixty percent of invalids indicated that better climatic conditions were the primary
reason they wanted to leave the North. A third of respondents indicated that that they wanted to
migrate from the North in order to earn additional income; better educational opportunities for
their children; or to live closer to relatives or friends (respondent could give up to three answers).
For invalids, roughly the same share as pensioners (96.5 percent) indicated that neither they nor
their relatives could afford any portion of the cost of relocation or establishing themselves in a
new location. Two-thirds of invalids indicated the primary need they had in the migration process
was assistance with the acquisition of housing. A quarter estimate the cost of the move at
between 50,000 and 100,000  rubles ($8,000 to $16,000) and seventy percent estimate the cost to
be over 100,000 rubles. Ninety percent indicate that they don't have sufficient savings to be able
to finance the migration themselves.
93.  The unemployed in the survey have a higher share native born than the other groups,
with a third born in the Northern region they are currently residing in and less than 10 percent
having lived in the North for more than 30 years. Because of the age structure, most are many
years from retirement, with half being more than 10 years from pension age. Nearly half of the
unemployed surveyed had been out of work over a year. Nearly half had quit their positions and a
third had lost their positions because of a liquidation or reorganization of the enterprise. A much
57smaller share (56 percent) of the unemployed versus pensioners or invalids desired to leave the
North. About 90 percent of unemployed state that they or their relatives do not have the financial
resources to be able to pay for transport from the North and establishing themselves in a new
location in the south.
94.  The fourth group of potential migrants questioned were students in their final year of
compulsory school or in professional-technical institutions (PTUs). Two-thirds of students
interviewed were born in the North. Eighty-seven percent were in their final year of compulsory
school and 13 percent were students in PTUs. Most (87 percent) intended on continuing their
schooling beyond completion at their current level. Of those who would like to continue their
education, 37 percent indicated that they would like to do so outside the region they are currently
living in. Seventeen percent stated that they would like to continue their schooling in the oblast
center. Thus, for over half of students, continuing their education according to their desires
would require a migration.
Table 14: Results of the Survey of Potential Migrants in Selected Northern Regions
Pensioners  Invalids Unemployed
Total number of respondents  471  438  403
Norilsk Industrial Region  121  94  106
Magadan oblast  120  122  63
Komi Republic  117  122  108
Nenets Autonomous  Okrug  113  100  126
Length of time lived in region (percent)
Since birth  12.6  29.9  33.5
less than 10 years  2.6  4.3  12.7
10 to 20 years  14.7  23.3  25.8
20 to 30 years  22.3  27.2  18.4
more than 30 years  47.1  15.3  9.7
Would like to leave the North (percent)
Yes  62.1  68.1  55.5
No  37.9  31.9  44.5
Are your relatives prepared to pay for your resettlement from the
North? (percent)
Yes,  transportation and new residence  1.1  0.7  2.0
Yes, partial transportation and new residence  1.5  0.5  5.6
Yes, partial transportation only  1.1  2.2  3.1
No  96.3  96.5  89.4
Do you have sufficient savings to be able to migrate from the
North? (percent)
We have no savings  72.7  89.3  80.3
We don't have sufficient savings  21.4  8.2  15.0
We only have savings that will pay for transportation  2.6  0.7  1.9
Yes, provided guaranteed income and housing subsidy  3.3  1.9  2.7
5895.  As the results of this survey show, the migration potential is rather high even though
many were born in the North or had lived in the region long enough for it to be considered their
home. As was also confirmed, the barriers to migration remain high in terms of people being able
to afford the cost of migration from the North and establishing themselves in a new location.
Further research at the individual level, including among the employed population is probably
needed.
96.  With price liberalization, privatization, and more open foreign trade, some Northern
industries benefited while most suffered. To more precisely determine the effect that these
structural changes in the Northern economy have on migration would require an industry-by-
industry examination of changes in the demand for products produced in the North and changes
in the structure of costs of these industries. Ideally, this should be done at the settlement level.
Though most of the Northern migration that has occurred has been out-migration  from the North,
it cannot be precluded that some of these structural changes will induce labor shortages in select
Northern settlements creating a demand for migration to the North. This has already begun to
appear in several North regions. In the Khanty-Mansiy and Yamal-Nenets regions of West
Siberia, there has been net in-migration  to those regions. These are the oil and gas regions of
Russia that have greatly benefited from Russia's economic transition. Besides Moscow, they
have been among the leading regions for foreign direct investment in Russia.
97.  The Russian State Committee for Northern Development (Goskomsever) has begun an
evaluation of small rural settlements across the North. It is examining their economic viability
and transport links to each of them. The purpose of this exercise is to make the Northern
shipment more efficient and also to reduce the cost of supplying goods to small, distant
settlements. They have recommended that 382 of the 1,400 small settlements in the North be shut
down. They do realize the difficulty of doing so. Many of the inhabitants of these settlements are
less skilled and have lived in the North for a long period of time. Officials from Goskomsever
believe that many of the inhabitants of these settlements  will not want to leave the North but will
want to move to the nearest oblast center.
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Amajority of  Russia's  crucial raw materials are located in its Northern..
periphery.  During the Soviet  period, there  was a unique set  of developmentl
practices  that existed  to exploit the resources  of the Northern regions.  These
included financial and other incentives  for people to move to and work in
the North and the construction  of large urban  agglomerations  in the region.
The  result was  that Russia  had a much more  densely populated  North than
other countries  with comparable  high-latitude regions.
One unintended consequence  of Russia's  transition to a market  economy
has been a massive  out-migration from the Northern periphery. From  the
16 regions  defined  as North in this study,  over 10 percent  of the population
has  migrated out since 1989.  At the extreme  are several  Northern regions
where over half the population has left during this period. Those  leaving
tended  to be younger  and more highly educated  in general  those  more  able
to do so. Many older and less  able persons  are left in the North without the
resources  to be able to leave.  The major causes  of this out-migration have
been price liberalization; fiscal decentralization; and a shift in Russia's
approach  to  the  development  of  its Arctic  and sub-Arctic  regions.
The study examines  patterns  of migration in the Russian  North during the
transition period beginning with a brief history of the settlement  of the
Russian  North. Data are  presented  showing  the composition  of the Northern
population  prior to transition, followed  by a description of the levels,
direction, age-sex  composition, educational, occupational  characteristics,
and mechanisms  of Northern migration trends.  The final section attempts
to determine  the possible  future levels  of migration  from the North that can
be expected.
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